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communicating with the legitimate verifier. The prover then generates a valid response which the third party
forwards to the verifier. Upon receiving this response, the verifier is convinced that he is communicating with
the legitimate prover and the attack succeeds. A variant of the mafia fraud, denoted by terrorist fraud, is an
attack in which the prover colludes with the adversary to deceive the verifier, and was subsequently proposed
by Bengio et al. [Bengio et al. 1991]. In practice, this involves a prover sharing protocol information, other
than key material, with a third-party in such a way that he allows this third-party to convince the verifier
that he is the legitimate prover without having to relay all the verifier’s messages.
Even though the mafia fraud could be classified as a special type of man-in-the-middle attack, there
are fundamental diﬀerences between these attacks. In man-in-the-middle attacks, the third party actively
modifies messages between the verifier and the prover, and in general the attack is made possible through
a security vulnerability in the protocol. In other words, man-in-the-middle attacks can be mitigated with
conventional security mechanisms. In mafia frauds, the third party is passive and simply relays messages.
He does not need to perform any further logical attack on the messages or the protocol sequence and in fact
the third party does not even need to know what he is relaying. The protocol and security mechanisms are
irrelevant as the attacker just relays the entire message generated by the legitimate parties, regardless of their
content, thereby ensuring that both the verifier and the prover always receive a valid message. Conventional
security mechanisms are therefore not an eﬀective countermeasure.
Brands and Chaum early proposed the idea of using so-called distance-bounding protocols [Brands and
Chaum 1993] to mitigate mafia fraud. In addition to mafia fraud, Brands and Chaum also considered the
possibility of distance fraud. Distance fraud involves a fraudulent prover that wants to convince the verifier
that he is closer than he really is. Most recently, a new fraud termed distance hijacking was proposed [Cremers
et al. 2012]. In this case, a fraudulent prover takes advantage of a protocol executed between an honest prover
and the verifier. The fraudulent prover selectively uses parts of this protocol instance to convince the verifier
that he is at a distance, at which some other honest prover resides, which diﬀers from the actual distance of
the dishonest prover to the verifier.
1.2. Practical Attacks
The frauds discussed above are of practical significance when considering real-world system security. For
example, mafia frauds are especially relevant in access control and payment systems. An RFID door access
reader might authenticate an access token by transmitting a challenge, e.g., a nonce, and then checking
whether the cryptographic response, constructed with the token’s key, is valid. In such a case, an attacker
can present a proxy-token, a device under the attacker’s control that emulates a token, to the door reader.
At the same time his accomplice has a proxy-reader, a reader under the attacker’s control, which is used to
communicate with a legitimate token. This can be done in a covert manner, e.g., holding the reader against
the token holder’s pocket while he is outside the premises. The attacker’s proxy-token gets the challenge
from the door reader and transmits it to the accomplice’s proxy-reader. The latter sends the challenge to the
legitimate token. The proxy-reader thus obtains the valid response, which is transmitted to the proxy-token
and then sent to the door reader. The door reader is now convinced that the token it is communicating with
is the legitimate token and opens the door. A practical mafia fraud of this nature was first demonstrated
by Hancke [Hancke 2006], using a built-for-purpose proxy-token and relaying radio channel with an eﬀective
range of 50 meters, alongside a modified oﬀ-the-shelf reader for the purpose of proxy-reader. Francillon,
Danev, and Cˇapkun have also practically demonstrated the feasibility of mafia frauds against remote keyless
entry systems in modern cars [Francillon et al. 2011].
Similarly, payment systems are also vulnerable to mafia fraud. An attacker could convince a customer to
insert his payment card into a proxy-reader, perhaps to pay for a low-value item sold to the customer by the
attacker. The attacker’s accomplice, in the meantime, purchases a high-value item and inserts his proxy-card
into the merchant’s reader. The high-value transaction is then conducted, via the proxy devices, with the
legitimate payment card. The proxy-reader only displays the low value amount for customer approval, who
thinks that he is authorising the transaction by entering his PIN on the proxy-reader. This PIN is transmitted
to the accomplice and it is entered into the merchant’s reader, which then verifies the PIN through the relay
setup with the legitimate card. As a causality the customer ends up paying for the attacker’s item. This
attack scenario was implemented against the “Chip and Pin” card payment system in the United Kingdom
by Drimer and Murdoch [Drimer and Murdoch 2007], and illustrates that mafia frauds can be a serious
threat even when systems use strong cryptography and two-factor authentication. The implementation of
near-field communication (NFC) in mobile phones has potentially decreased the complexity of implementing
mafia fraud. An NFC-enabled mobile phone can act as a token and a reader, so it can either act as a proxy-
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token or proxy-reader, while oﬀering multiple options with regards to communication channels for relaying
messages. The potential use of NFC devices in mafia frauds is documented by Kfir and Wool [Kfir and
Wool 2005], and a practical mafia fraud using NFC-enabled mobile phones has already been demonstrated
by Francis et al. [Francis et al. 2010]. Some additional attack scenarios and a discussion on the practical
implementation of mafia frauds can be found in [Hancke et al. 2009; Francis et al. 2013].
Real-time location systems (RTLS) are increasingly used to track high-value assets and people. A RTLS
relies on the fact that the physical relation between reference nodes, with fixed and known locations, and the
target can be estimated. If these estimates are somehow modified by an attacker then the overall localisation
process will be adversely aﬀected and the location of the target could be misrepresented. Cˇapkun and
Hubaux [Cˇapkun and Hubaux 2006] have shown that in the case of trilateration, and the principle extends
to multilateration, a target located outside a triangle of reference nodes cannot prove that it is inside the
triangle without shortening the distance measured to at least one of the reference nodes. Similarly, a node
located inside the triangle cannot prove it is at a diﬀerent location without decreasing the measured distance
to at least one of the nodes. This means that a fraudulent prover, wishing to misrepresent his own location,
must perpretate distance fraud against at least one reference node. In practice, distance fraud is relatively
simple in certain RTLS systems. For example, if the distances are estimated using received signal strength,
then an attacker could selectively attenuate or amplify his communication with a specific reference node.
Some practical distance-fraud strategies enabling a fraudulent prover to decrease the round-trip-time of his
responses are discussed in [Hancke and Kuhn 2008] and [Clulow et al. 2006].
Finally, relay attacks are particularly relevant in the field of digital rights management (DRM), although
this issue is rarely discussed in the literature. For example, a provider may refuse to deliver a content to the
customer if the latter is not in a clearly defined location, as stated for example in [Nikov and Vauclair 2008;
Abbadi and Mitchell 2007; Camp 2007].
1.3. Countermeasures to Relay Attacks
Mafia fraud is remarkably eﬀective against conventional cryptographic mechanisms. To detect this fraud, we
need to look beyond the data exchanged and incorporate the physical context of the interaction between
verifier and prover into the protocol. To do so, several methods were proposed to enhance authentication
protocols. Desmedt was the first to introduce solutions to counter the mafia fraud. In [Desmedt 1988], he
proposed to sign the prover GPS coordinates. In a second proposal [Beth and Desmedt 1990], the notion of
timed message exchanges was introduced. Using precise timing, Beth and Desmedt managed to detect the
little girl fraud via the delay introduced by the relay. Desmedt, alone in a first time, then later along with Beth,
was the first to remark that countering mafia fraud implied relying on physical properties (localization, or
timing) rather than only depending on the cryptographic parts. This observation yields to several propositions
to measure this physical property. Among them, distance bounding protocols were the most promising
counter-measure. To bound the distance between a prover and a verifier, several methods exist. Distance
bounding protocols can be built on the Received Signal Strength (RSS) [Bahl and Padmanabhan 2000], by
measuring the Angle-of-Arrival (AoA) [Ghavami et al. 2004], the noise level [Choudary and Stajano 2011],
the physical property of the communication channel [Stajano et al. 2010], the ambient environment [Halevi
et al. 2013; Uriena and Piramuthu 2014], or the measure of the Time Of the Flight (ToF).
The RSS, and the AoA methods are usually discarded due to implicit security flaws. Indeed, an adversary
can by increasing its signal strength or building special antenna deceive these measurements [Cheung 2004].
Methods based on the noise level or on channel properties work in theory. However, they are not practical
to implement.
ToF methods are more reliable, and often used to evaluate the distance d between two parties by calculating
d = spr · tp where spr is the propagation speed of signals on the medium of the communication channel and
tp is the one-way propagation time between the transmitter and the receiver [Hancke and Kuhn 2005]. n
attacker committing mafia fraud will unavoidably increase the time that the message takes to travel between
the prover and verifier. Even simply forwarding and transmitting messages increases the ToF. Measuring
this time and checking for unexpected delay in a response is therefore recognised as a feasible method
for detecting mafia fraud [Beth and Desmedt 1990]. ToF distance estimation comprises both Time-of-arrival
(ToA) or round-trip-time (RTT) approaches. ToA requires both a verifier and prover to share a synchronised,
high-precision clock and only the propagation time of a single message is measured. For example, the verifier
sends a challenge chall to the prover, and records the time t0 it was sent. The prover records the time t0+ tp
the challenge was received and responds with the authenticated message {t0 + tp, chall}. If both the prover
and the verifier are trusted, this protocol is eﬀective in detecting mafia frauds. However, it is vulnerable to
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distance fraud as the prover can simply decrease the value of t0 + tp in the response to appear closer. From
a practical perspective, both the prover and the verifier might not have a synchronised precise clock, e.g., an
RFID reader could have such a precise clock but a tag not.
1.4. Distance-Bounding Based on RTT
Both these issues can be addressed using an RTT distance-estimation approach. In RTT, the verifier measures
the time tm from the moment he has sent a challenge to the moment the response is received. The verifier
is therefore completely in control of the measurement and he is also the only entity that requires a precise
clock. In this case the verifier can estimate the distance d = c · (tm − td)/2, where tm is the round-trip-time,
equal to 2·tp+td, and td is the time the prover takes to calculate the response. For example, the verifier sends
a challenge chall at t0, which the prover receives at t0 + tp. The prover sends a response back at t0 + tp + td
and this is received at tv = t0 + 2 · tp + td, allowing for the RTT to be calculated as tm = tv − t0. The
fraudulent prover can no longer directly influence the measurement, as is the case with ToA, but he could
try to send its response earlier than he receives the challenge. To prevent this, a protocol must be designed
in such a way that the response depends on the challenge, i.e., r = f(chall), so that the prover has to wait
for the challenge before responding. This response function f also determines the length of the processing
time td, which must be minimal and deterministic, to achieve an accurate estimate. The response function
must therefore be of minimal complexity and should be processable in a short and predictable time.
Distance-bounding protocols are closely linked to aspects of the physical communication channel, a side
eﬀect of requiring accurate timing measurements. The channel on which the challenges and responses are to
be transmitted must therefore be chosen in such a way that it does not adversely aﬀects the security of the
protocol or the accuracy of the distance estimated. Conventional communication channels have been shown to
be unsuitable for secure distance-bounding protocols, due to the possibility that an attacker could exploit the
latency introduced in these channels by error-resistant measures, such as framing/integrity data and filters in
transceivers [Clulow et al. 2006; Hancke and Kuhn 2008]. In practice, building a distance-bounding channel is
a hard problem. Even if we only considered the distance estimation requirements, a timing measurement error
of 1 ns could result in a distance estimation error of approximately 30 cm, and measuring the RTT to this
level of accuracy is not feasible in systems often suggested to benefit from distance bounding. Implementing
suitable channels is still an open research question, although there are several proposals already described
and practically demonstrated in the literature [Reid et al. 2007; Rasmussen et al. 2009; Rasmussen and
Cˇapkun 2010; Hancke 2010; Drimer and Murdoch 2007].
In 2006, Clulow et al. [Clulow et al. 2006] proposed four principles for implementing a secure channel for
timed challenge-response exchanges:
(1) Use a communication medium with a propagation speed as close as possible to the physical limit, i.e.
speed of light.
(2) Use a communication format in which only a single symbol is transmitted as challenge of response.
(3) Minimize the length of this symbol, or the time taken to decide the value of the symbol.
(4) Design the protocol such that it copes with errors during the challenge-response exchange.
These principles have historical significance, as this work was the first to look at the security implications
of the underlying implementation of the exchange channel. However, there is a growing opinion that these
principles, aiming for theoretical security, are not fully achievable in practice. As such it is perhaps better
to consider the intentions behind the principles’ definition, which helps us understand potential security
threats and evaluate the eﬀectiveness of a channel used for distance bounding, rather than considering these
as hard conditions for secure distance bounding. The first principle advises against the use of channels
with a relatively low propagation speed as this would allow an attacker to use a faster channel to relay
the communication and not be detected. For example, if distance bounding is conducted across a sound
channel the attacker can execute an undetectable relay attack using wired or radio communication. The
second principle advises against sending multiple challenges and responses during a single timed exchange,
and against the transmission of any additional information even for purposes of error detection or formatting,
e.g. any parity bits, cyclic redundancy checks (CRC), headers/trailers or start/stop bits. In both cases it
is shown that a dishonest prover could exploit such exchanges to correctly send a reply earlier than what
is expected from a honest prover adhering to the channel rules. The nature of the attack depends on the
format of the message but the general idea is that the dishonest prover can calculate and prepare the
response before the entire challenge message is received, thus shortening the response time compared to a
honest prover waiting for the entire message. The third principle advises that the decision as to the value
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of the symbol should be made as quickly as possible. If the symbol modulation/encoding is such that the
entire symbol must be received the symbol period must be minimised or the receiver should determine the
value early on in the symbol period. This is meant to protect against early detect/late send relay attacks,
where the attacker can take advantage of the duration between the start of the symbol and when the receiver
actually determines its value. For example, when using non-return to zero (NRZ) coding the receiver usually
samples the symbol after ts/2, where ts is the symbol period, which allows for the maximum tolerance to
data clock diﬀerences between the sender and receiver. If the attacker can sample the symbol at ts/10, he has
4 · ts/10 to relay its value and transmit it to the receiver. In such a case, there will be no detectable delay in
the communication and distance bounding would be ineﬀective. To minimise the amount of time available to
the attacker the receiver must therefore make its decision as early as possible during the symbol period. The
fourth principle, taking into account that principles two and three would not allow for conventional error
detection/correction measures and reduces the receiver’s tolerances for reliably decoding of data, advises
that the protocol cannot expect that the exchange channel will have no communication errors and that this
has to be taken into consideration elsewhere in the system.
1.5. Protocol Evolution
Distance-bounding protocols are based on the Round-Trip-Time (RTT) of challenge-response messages, and
are essentially meant to detect any unexpected delay in the provers response inherently caused by the
messages being relayed over a larger distance by a third party [Hancke et al. 2009]. To eﬀectively achieve this
goal, protocols must meet some simple requirements to obtain an accurate propagation time measurement,
as explained in the previous section: the response and challenge must be single bits, the response must be
dependent on the challenge and the time taken to calculate the response must be minimal and predictable.
There are a number of protocols that aim to implement distance-bounding but do not adhere to these
requirements, e.g., [Beth and Desmedt 1990; Waters and Felten 2003; Nikov and Vauclair 2008]. However,
they are not capable of providing accurate distance estimates because of the variation in the time taken to
calculate the response, which makes them unsuitable for many use cases. For example, the time taken by a
smart token to encrypt a message or perform a digital signature diﬀers each time. If such a token usually
takes 100 ms to calculate a response and if there is even a 0.1% variation, this results in a RTT variation of
0.1 ms and hence a 30000 km distance estimate error. This paper only considers protocols proposals adhering
to the prescribed requirements for distance-bounding.
In a distance-bounding protocol, not all exchanged messages are subject to round-trip-time measurements.
The protocol can be divided into three distinct phases: setup, exchange, and verification. During the setup
phase, the verifier and the prover exchange some initial information and determine the cryptographic material
used during the rest of the protocol. During the exchange stage, the verifier measures the round-trip-time
of the challenge-response pairs. The validity of the responses and the distance-bound is checked during the
verification stage. The setup and verification phases are commonly referred to as the “slow” phases, while
the exchange phase is referred to as the “fast” phase, due to the nature of the communication during these
phases. The slow phase uses a conventional channel while the fast phase requires a special channel.
The first distance-bounding protocol was proposed by Brands and Chaum [Brands and Chaum 1993]. This
protocol, based on Beth and Desmedt’s [Beth and Desmedt 1990] idea that RTT can detect mafia fraud,
bounds the distance between the parties by measuring the RTT of single-bit challenges and responses. During
the setup phase, the prover cryptographically commits to a random string that he will use to calculate the
responses using an XOR operation. During the verification stage the prover signs a message containing the
challenges received and the response sent. The protocol achieved an optimal
(
1
2
)n
resistance against both
mafia and distance fraud, where n is the number of challenge-response exchanges. This concept formed the
basis for numerous protocols, whose evolution is represented on Figure 1.
There are four direct descendents of Brands and Chaum’s protocol: [Peris-Lopez et al. 2010; Rasmussen
and Cˇapkun 2010; Cˇapkun et al. 2003; Hancke and Kuhn 2005], each of which improved Brands and Chaum
in its own way. Peris-Lopez et al. [Peris-Lopez et al. 2010] propose that cryptographic puzzles should be
used to provide privacy in distance-bounding protocols. Rasmussen and Cˇapkun protocol [Rasmussen and
Cˇapkun 2010] is based on XOR and a comparison function, and has the benefit that the prover does not
need to demodulate the signal to answer to the verifier’s challenges. The MAD protocol proposed by Cˇapkun
et al. [Cˇapkun et al. 2003] allows for mutual distance-bounding between the two parties. This protocol was
enhanced by the MAD protocol of Singele´e and Preneel [Singele´e and Preneel 2007], which added bit-error
resilience to MAD by using error correcting codes. The Hancke and Kuhn’s protocol [Hancke and Kuhn
2005], originally designed to be used in the RFID environment and is thus optimised for execution time and
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Fig. 1: Distance-bounding evolution
minimal prover complexity, uses pre-computation, instead of a commitment step, during the setup phase in
such a way that no additional messages need to be transmitted during the verification stage.
Hancke and Kuhn’s protocol has two issues: it does not take terrorist attacks into account, and achieves
a sub-optimal performance-security trade-oﬀ with respect to the mafia and distance fraud of
(
3
4
)n
. Subse-
quently, numerous proposals based on the pre-computation method used by Hancke and Kuhn were proposed
in an eﬀort to improve its performance. Bussard and Bagga’s protocol [Bussard and Bagga 2005] and all
its descendants introduce resistance to terrorist fraud. These protocols are based on Bussard and Bagga’s
idea that the prover long-term secret is incorporated into the pre-computed response options in such a way
that if the prover revealed all the options his accomplice would also get the prover’s key. This therefore
discourages the prover to participate in a terrorist fraud, but the cost is a complex proof-of-knowledge oper-
ation. Its descendants aim to achieve the same functionality but with decreased computational complexity.
Reid et al. [Reid et al. 2007] so improves the computational eﬃciency but the fraud resistance is ( 34 )
n in
comparison to Bussard and Bagga’s
(
1
2
)n
. Tu and Piramuthu’s protocol [Tu and Piramuthu 2007] proposes
a protocol compounded by a succession of fast and slow phases. However, this protocol suﬀers from sev-
eral vulnerabilities, discussed in [Kim et al. 2008; Munilla and Peinado 2008b], that reveal the secret to an
eavesdropper during a legitimate protocol run. The “swiss-knife” protocol [Kim et al. 2008] fixes the poor
mafia fraud resistance problem by adding a third phase to Reid et al.’s protocol, and it also provides mutual
authentication. In [Peris-Lopez et al. 2009], the authors claim that they found an attack on this protocol
based on nonce repetitions, and thus propose the Hitomi variation. However, if the assumption is made that
nonces repeat then Hitomi suﬀers, to a lesser extent, of a similar flaw. A further variation of the swiss-knife
protocol [Avoine et al. 2011] explicitly introduces secret-sharing to counter the terrorist fraud, and studies
the best settings in which to use it. The paper also explains several vulnerabilities found in previous protocols
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designed to mitigate terrorist fraud. Avoine and Tchamkerten’s protocol [Avoine and Tchamkerten 2009]
introduces binary trees to compute the prover answers during the exchange phase, and succeeds in improving
the mafia fraud resilience of the pre-computation protocol to almost ( 12 )
n. Indeed, various graph structures
can be used instead of a tree structure. The interest of cyclic and q-partite graphs has been demonstrated
in [Trujillo-Rasua et al. 2010] and [Mauw et al. 2016], respectively. Finally, Trujillo et al. [Trujillo-Rasua
et al. 2014] show that precomputation-based protocols can also deal with noise without sacrificing security.
Munilla and Peinado [Munilla et al. 2006; Munilla and Peinado 2008a] initiated a new branch of the
Hancke-Kuhn pre-computation family. They proposed to communicate during the exchange phase using
binary symbols, 0 and 1, and also an additional “nothing” state. MUSE [Avoine et al. 2009] is a generalization
of this idea by relaxing the number of possible states used during the exchange phase. Kim and Avoine’s
protocols [Kim and Avoine 2009; 2011] enhance the attack detection mechanism. Its descendant [Yum et al.
2011] uses the detection mechanism as means to also provide mutual authentication. Finally, Kardas¸ et
al. [Kardas¸ et al. 2011] introduce the use of PUFs in Hancke and Kuhn’s protocol and claim the protocol
now resists to the terrorist fraud.
1.6. Provable Security
Most distance-bounding protocols have been analyzed without a formal approach. Instead, generic best-
known attacks are usually adapted to the specific features of the protocol at hand, which has led to unsound
analyzes and unfair comparisons. Examples are the protocols proposed in [Munilla et al. 2006], [Tu and
Piramuthu 2007], and [Yum et al. 2011], whose flaws are explored in [Avoine et al. 2011], [Munilla and
Peinado 2008b], and [Avoine and Kim 2013], respectively. The first comprehensive formalization for analyzing
distance-bounding protocols was proposed by Avoine et al. [Avoine et al. 2011]; this is not a provable security
formalism, but it is a framework that can describe attack-scenarios in a unitary fashion, and thus oﬀer a
systematic manner of computing upper-bounds on the probabilities of typical attacks in distance-bounding
and its variants. This unified framework [Avoine et al. 2011] defines the following important objects: the
prover model (depending on the tampering-resistance of the prover, it can be either black-box or white-box );
the prover’s computing capabilities (e.g., whether the prover can exploit latencies between the slow and fast
phases); and the attacker’s strategies (e.g., pre-ask, post-ask, and early-reply). Details of this formalism are
provided in Section 2.
Recent eﬀorts have been made on proving security for distance-bounding [Du¨rholz et al. 2011; Boureanu
et al. 2013a; 2013c; 2013b; Fischlin and Onete 2013b; Vaudenay 2013]. However, this is still a very young field
that needs to overcome three main, inter-dependent challenges: (i) the introduction of sound communication,
network and adversarial models that capture the notion of time-of-flight, (ii) the definition of clear and
rigorous specifications of the classical frauds (i.e., formal definitions of these frauds that can be proven to
hold or to be refuted within the model), and (iii) formal security proofs based on cryptographic assumptions.
To illustrate for instance the diﬃculty of the third challenge, [Boureanu et al. 2012] proved that many
protocols fall short in having their security based on the pseudorandom function (PRF) assumption of some
underlying primitive.
The first formalism in this direction was put forward by Du¨rholz et al. [Du¨rholz et al. 2011]. The authors
formalize the impossibility of illegitimate yet suﬃciently fast round-trip communications using the notion of
tainted sessions; to encode timing-restrictions, tainted sessions only allow certain flows of communication.
Then, a protocol is said to be secure if no adversary executing it with tainted sessions can violate its security
properties. The model comprises a formalisation of all the classical frauds and provides several (partial)
security proofs for some protocols [Du¨rholz et al. 2011; Fischlin and Onete 2013a]. This formal model is a
step in the right direction towards provably secure distance-bounding.
Another line on provably secure distance-bounding, which builds on the model by Du¨rholz et al., is
in [Fischlin and Onete 2013b]. One addition therein is proposing a distance-bounding protocol that uses
not one but two secret keys, i.e., one for the un-timed and one for the timed phase. This bypasses the
aforementioned problem of using just the PRF-assumption to argue the security of (one-key) distance-
bounding.
In [Boureanu et al. 2013a; 2013c], the authors provide a rather general model that captures the notion of
concurrency (i.e., allowing adversaries to interact with many provers and verifiers, sometimes with the same
keys). Their notions of distance and mafia frauds additionally capture the one of distance hijacking [Cremers
et al. 2012] and impersonation [Du¨rholz et al. 2011], respectively. Furthermore, their definition for terrorist-
fraud is more general than the notion of terrorist fraud adopted in this manuscript: after the initial collusion,
the possible threats to protect against may be stronger in [Boureanu et al. 2013a; 2013c] (e.g., MiM in
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concurrent settings). The authors also propose a set of distance-bounding schemes oﬀering provable security
against all forms of attacks within their model. A simplified version of [Boureanu et al. 2013a], where the
elements of provable security are played down to best-attack scenarios, is available in [Boureanu et al. 2013b].
As depicted above, attention to provably secure distance-bounding is increasing. However, we underline
that there is little consensus on which formalisations are appropriate, by diﬀerent metrics. This is evident
for instance in the formalisation of terrorist-fraud (TF) resistance, arguably due in part to its non-falsifiable
nature which –in turn– renders it hard to (provably) attain in distance bounding designs.
Firstly, we underline a distinction between a commonplace view on TF resistance and the formal expres-
sions of this. There is a wide-spread acceptation in the distance bounding literature that TF resistance
ought to repose on the reduction to the impossibility to protect against the “trivial vulnerability” whereby
a prover gives away his secret-key to the adversary. That is, a protocol is often popularly understood to be
TF resistant if the dishonest prover who helps the adversary authenticate fraudulently in one run leaks his
secret key to the adversary. Whilst this is a valid acceptation, the formal models above generally do not
formalise precisely this commonplace view on terrorist-fraud resistance. Some approaches, e.g., [Fischlin and
Onete 2013b; Boureanu et al. 2015], formalise the following statement: the protocol is resistant to TF or
some generalisations thereof if whenever the dishonest prover helps the adversary authenticate fraudulently,
the adversary gains advantages in future authentication attempts in the absence of the illicit help. Other
approaches [Vaudenay 2013] encode formally that the protocol is sound (or terrorist-fraud resistant in a
generalised sense) if the following holds: for all protocol-runs with a verifier, there exists an extractor who
reconstructs the secret when he is given the knowledge of all participants which were close to the verifier in
several successful executions.
Secondly, authors have changed and abridged their own formal definitions of these expressions of TF
resistance. Onete et al. define SimTF , StrongSimTF , and GameTF terrorist-fraud resistance [Du¨rholz
et al. 2011; Fischlin and Onete 2013b]. Boureanu et al. put forward formalisations of terrorist-fraud resistance
in [Boureanu et al. 2013b], as well as formalisations of generalisations of TF resistance in notions of collusion-
fraud resistance [Boureanu et al. 2013a; 2015]. To this end, Vaudenay took collusion-fraud resistance further
into a notion of soundness [Vaudenay 2013] akin to similar expressions in interactive proofs.
Thirdly, one can argue that some of these formal definitions for TF resistance might yield too strong
a requirement, disproving security all-throughout (like the SimTF formulation of terrorist-fraud resistance
in [Du¨rholz et al. 2011]), or might be too general (like aforementioned collusion-fraud resistance in [Boureanu
et al. 2013a] that suits the provable security of the SKI schemes [Boureanu et al. 2015]), or less realistic (like
the SimTF formulation for terrorist-fraud resistance in [Du¨rholz et al. 2011] in which the dishonest prover
and the adversary are not allowed to communicate during the fast rounds). On the one hand, when we
fix the model, we can nonetheless see that some of these definitions imply one another (StrongSimTF
in [Fischlin and Onete 2013b] implies SimTF in [Du¨rholz et al. 2011], and soundness in [Vaudenay 2013]
implies collusion-fraud resistance in [Boureanu et al. 2015], for certain parameters). On the other hand, even
in one such fixed model, other definitions remain however incomparable (e.g., GameTF and StrongSimTF
in [Fischlin and Onete 2013b]), underlying further the unsettlement of formalising terrorist-fraud resistance
even within one and the same formalism.
Last but not least, formal comparisons between the session-based model in [Du¨rholz et al. 2011; Fischlin
and Onete 2013b] and the model inspired by interactive proofs in [Boureanu et al. 2015; Vaudenay 2013] do
not exist. In the absence of a formal proof aligning the two models and their security definitions, it appears
that SimTF resistance in [Du¨rholz et al. 2011] is equivalent to the notion of terrorist-fraud resistance
in [Boureanu et al. 2013b] and that GameTF resistance in [Fischlin and Onete 2013b] is equivalent to
collusion-fraud resistance in [Boureanu et al. 2013a] (for some parameters).
Similar discussions apply –of course– to the formalisations of threats other than terrorist-fraud in the afore-
mentioned formalisms. As such, formal relations between the existing formal models for distance-bounding
and their formal definitions of security is an avenue of future research.
Due to such diﬀerences between the formal models, we decided to carry out our analyses in the general
framework by Avoine et al. [Avoine et al. 2011]. This framework does not repose on such fine-grained
formalisations of the distance-bounding threats1, but instead it formalises classes of interactions between the
provers and the attackers in order to best classify attack strategies, towards an unitary approach to assessing
the security/insecurity of distance-bounding.
1For instance, the popular take on TF resistance by reduction to impossible protection against the “trivial vulnerability” is not
attainable in the “white box model for TF” from [Avoine et al. 2011], whilst some of the formal expressions for TF resistance
summarised above would be.
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1.7. Contributions
This article provides an in-depth security comparison of many existing distance bounding protocols. After the
introduction in Section 2 of the notation and the methodology used in this article, the next twelve sections
present several important published distance bounding protocols. Each section presents in a unified way the
considered protocol and its security analysis. Those who are not familiar with the presented protocols will
be able to consult Appendix A, which provides thorough descriptions of the twelve protocols. Section 15
presents the comparison methodology and results. The article also includes Appendix B, which discusses
about variants and extensions that can be applied to most of the considered protocols.
2. ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY AND NOTATIONS
This paper analyzes twelve distance-bounding protocols using a unique methodology, based on the distance-
bounding framework published in [Avoine et al. 2011]. Table I contains the unified notations used throughout
the paper. Each protocol description is divided into 3 steps, namely initialization, protocol, and final phase,
and includes a table that summarizes the protocol parameters. Protocols consist of slow phases that are not
time-constrained, and fast phases where the verifier measures the round-trip times of exchanged messages.
The fast phases are identified with a left square bracket. Anything in the bracket is repeated n times, except
if stated otherwise. Each protocol description is followed by a security analysis according to the template
provided in Section 2.2. The properties and performance are analyzed according to Section 2.3 and 2.4.
2.1. Fraud definitions
A distance bounding protocol is a process whereby a party (known as verifier) is assured (i) of the identity of
a second party (know as prover) (ii) that the prover is located in his close vicinity (known as neighborhood).
Four frauds against distance bounding are usually considered, impersonation, distance, mafia, and terrorist
frauds [Avoine et al. 2011], which are introduced below.
◦ Impersonation. An impersonation fraud is an attack where an adversary acting alone purports to be a
legitimate prover.
◦ Distance fraud. A distance fraud is an attack where a dishonest prover purports to be in the neighborhood
of the verifier. He cheats without help of other entities located in the neighborhood.
◦ Mafia fraud. A mafia fraud is an attack where an adversary defeats a distance-bounding protocol using a
man-in-the-middle between the verifier and an honest prover located outside the neighborhood.
◦ Terrorist fraud. A terrorist fraud is an attack where an adversary defeats a distance-bounding protocol
using a man-in-the-middle between the verifier and a dishonest prover located outside of the neighborhood
under the following circumstances. The dishonest prover actively helps the adversary to maximize her current
attack success probability, but without giving her any advantage for future man-in-the-middle attacks. (In
such attacks, the man-in-the-middle (MiM) would attempt to pass the distance-bounding protocol as a valid
prover/tag which the MiM does not represent/possess.)
Note that protocols that are known to suﬀer from a key-recovery attack are not analyzed in this article.
This includes Tu and Piramuthu’s protocol [Tu and Piramuthu 2007] whose flaws are discussed in [Kim
et al. 2008; Munilla and Peinado 2008b], Reid et al.’s protocol [Reid et al. 2007] broken in [Avoine et al.
2011; Mitrokotsa et al. 2010], and Hitomi whose vulnerabilities are described in [Sohizadeh Abyaneh 2011].
While [Bay et al. 2012] points out a key recovery attack on Bussard and Bagga’s protocol [Bussard and
Bagga 2005], this protocol is kept in this analysis because the attacks presented in [Bay et al. 2012] could
be applied to other protocols and designers must be aware of their existence to avoid them. Note also that
the length of the long-term secret keys of the parties, the length of the signatures (when appropriate), and
the length of the nonces are assumed to be large enough, such that exhaustive search and replay attack are
not relevant. Finally, the pseudo random functions used in the protocols are assumed to be without design
flaws, i.e., no trapdoor pseudo random functions, like those discussed in [Boureanu et al. 2012].
Another type of fraud, known as distance hijacking, has recently been introduced in [Cremers et al. 2012].
The fraud considers a dishonest prover who aims to convince a verifier that he is located within the verifier’s
neigborhood, abusing for that some other provers who are indeed in the verifier’s neigborhood. For example,
a dishonest prover can reach his goal by hijacking the fast phase of a distance-bounding protocol executed
between an honest (closer) prover and the verifier. Conceptually, distance hijacking can be placed between
distance fraud and terrorist fraud. Unlike terrorist fraud, where a dishonest prover colludes with another
attacker, distance hijacking considers a dishonest prover who interacts with (abuses) other honest provers.
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Prover and Verifier
P , IDP Prover, Prover identity
V , IDV Verifier, Verifier identity
NV , NP Nonces sent by verifier and prover, respectively.
Rounds
n Number of rounds in the fast phase
i Index of the current round
Secrets
K Long-term secret key shared by prover and verifier
Ke, Kd Public/Private keys for Encryption/Decryption
Ks, Kv Private/Public keys for Signature/Verification
Time
∆ti Round Trip Time (RTT) measured during round i
tmax Threshold on the round-trip time (typically, there is a round failure if ∆ti > tmax)
Challenges and Responses
ci Challenge sent by the verifier in round i
c′i Challenge received by the prover in round i
ri Response sent by the prover in round i
r′i Response received by the verifier in round i
Registers
R0, R1 Main registers
Z0,Z1,... Additional registers, when needed.
H Crypto function output (hash, encrypt, ...), usually viewed as a register, e.g., H = h(NV , NP )
Sizes
σ Size of the signature, commitment, or MAC (in the slow phase)
ιP ,ιV ,ι Size of IDP and IDV . If |IDP |=|IDV | then the value is simply denoted ι (bits)
κ Size of K (bits)
δP , δV , δ Size of the random nonces NV and NP . If |NV | = |NP | then the value is simply denoted δ (bits)
Errors
eX Number of errors of type X, e.g., eC , eR, eT
emax Threshold on the number of errors
Functions
dH(., .) Hamming distance
H(.) Hamming weight
SignKs (.) Signature function with private key Ks
VerifKv (.) Public-key signature verification function with public key Kv
Commit(.) Commitment function
Open(.) Open commitment function
h(.) Cryptographic hash function
hK(.) Cryptographic hash function keyed with the secret key K
MACK(.) Message authentication code keyed with the secret key K
fK(.) Pseudorandom function keyed with the secret key K
EK(.) Encryption function keyed with the secret key K
DK(.) Decryption function keyed with the secret key K
Misc
E(.) Mathematical expectation
∈R Randomly and uniformly picked in...
∈R {0, 1}x Randomly and uniformly picked in the set {0, 1}x, typically x = δ
|| Concatenation of words (possibly 1-bit words)
p Number of runs of the cryptographic function, in the analyzes
p,q Prime numbers.
pX Probability of event X
w Hamming weight, e.g., w = H(x)
Table I: Notations
Unlike distance fraud that only involves a dishonest prover and a verifier, distance hijacking also involves other
honest provers. These seemingly subtle diﬀerences have significant consequences, e.g., the countermeasures
proposed against terrorist fraud strictly depend on the fact that the dishonest prover needs to share data
with another attacker. In fact, the protocols BC [Brands and Chaum 1993], MAD [Cˇapkun et al. 2003], and
RC [Rasmussen and Cˇapkun 2010] are not resistant against hijacking fraud according to [Cremers et al. 2012].
The version of RC presented in Section 10 comes from [Rasmussen 2011]. This is a version that has been
modified to be resilient to distance hijacking. Cremers et al. provide in [Cremers et al. 2012] a clear analysis
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of existing protocols that resist to the hijacking fraud. Vaudenay analyzes additional protocols in [Vaudenay
2015]. We consequently refer the reader to these articles to get more information about distance hijacking.
2.2. Security
The analyses usually performed in distance-bounding do not provide a security proof, but state the resistance
of a protocol given a clearly defined scenario, which includes the type of fraud, but also the adversary’s
capabilities and strategies, described below and summarized in Table II.
Table II: Attack scenarios
Fraud
Prover Prover Computing Adversary Success
Model Capability Strategy Probability
Impersonation (1) (1) (4) PrImp
Mafia (1) (1)
pre-ask PrMF|pre
post-ask PrMF|post
Distance
black-box (2)
pre-ask & early-reply PrDF|BB|pre&early
post-ask & early reply PrDF|BB|post&early
white-box
single run
early-reply
PrDF|WB(1)|early
multiple run PrDF|WB(p)|early
Terrorist
black-box (2) (3) (3)
white-box
single run
early-provide
PrTF|WB(1)
multiple run PrTF|WB(p)
(1) The prover does not cheat in such a fraud: considering his capabilities is consequently not relevant.
(2) Considering the prover’s computing capabilities is not relevant in the black box model.
(3) This case is equivalent to the mafia fraud.
(4) No strategy is defined in [Avoine et al. 2011] for the impersonation.
◦ Prover model. Depending on the tamper-resistance of the prover, two models are defined: black-box and
white-box models. In the black-box model, the prover can neither observe nor tamper with the execution of
the algorithm. In the white-box model, the prover has full access to the implementation of the algorithm
and a complete control over the execution environment, as detailed in [Avoine et al. 2011].
◦ Prover computing capabilities. The prover computing capabilities may aﬀect the security of the protocol
when considering distance and terrorist frauds in the white box model, given that the prover is also the
attacker in such frauds. For example, in HK protocol, the prover may exploit a latency between the slow
and fast phases to generate registers with a low Hamming distance [Avoine et al. 2011].
◦ Adversary strategies. The framework [Avoine et al. 2011] points out that three relevant adversary’s strate-
gies should be considered when analyzing a distance-bounding protocol: pre-ask, post-ask, and early-reply
strategies. In the pre-ask strategy, the adversary relays the first slow phase between the verifier and the
prover, then executes the fast phase with the prover before the verifier starts it. In the post-ask strategy,
the adversary relays the first slow phase, then executes the fast phase with the verifier without involving
the prover. The adversary then queries the prover with the correct challenges received during the fast phase.
This strategy is meaningful when the protocol is completed with a second slow phase used to check that the
challenges received by the prover are correct. In the early-reply strategy, the adversary anticipates the replies
to make them arrive on time, which is particularly relevant with distance fraud. No strategy for the terrorist
fraud is defined in [Avoine et al. 2011]. We introduce here the early-provide strategy: in this strategy, the
adversary located inside the neighborhood, first relays the slow phase to the prover. The latter then provides
to the adversary some information to help him to improve her success probability during the fast phase with
the verifier. Finally, the adversary relays the final slow phase, if any.
Remark 2.1 (Circle analysis). A prover located outside the neighborhood of the verifier but not too far
may receive some challenges while the protocol is still running. When the rounds of the fast phase are
independent, this late information is useless. However, the adversary may use this information to increase
her success probability when the rounds are not independent. Consequently, when analyzing the resistance of
a protocol against distance and terrorist frauds the area the prover is located should be considered. However,
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in all the analyzed protocols, either this scenario is not relevant due to the round independency, or the
calculation of the success probability is still an open problem.
Remark 2.2 (Multiple-execution). The framework also points out that some information could leak when
the protocol is executed several times. Typically, this case occurs when the prover and the verifier generate
two registers without involving randomness from the prover. None of the protocols analyzed in the paper are
known to suﬀer from this weakness. Consequently, it is not explicitely addressed in the analysis.
2.3. Properties
The protocol properties considered in the paper are described below and summarized in Table III. Note
that the type of data exchanged during the fast phase is usually binary. This is the case for all protocols
considered in this analysis, excepted the one discussed in Section 14.
◦ Adaptiveness. Indicates whether the protocol provides an adjustable trade-oﬀ between resistance to mafia
and distance frauds.
◦ Mutual authentication. Indicates whether the protocol provides mutual authentication. Note that, mutual
authentication does not imply mutual distance-bounding: while the identity proof is bilateral in that case,
the distance proof is unilateral in all the analyzed protocols.
◦ Second slow phase. Indicates whether there is a second slow phase in the protocol after the fast phase.
◦ Independence of the rounds. Indicates whether each expected response during the fast phase depends on
the current challenge only.
2.4. Performance
The protocol performances considered are described below and summarized in Table IV.
◦ Cryptographic primitives. Type of cryptographic primitives needed to be implemented on the prover side:
cryptographically-secure pseudo-random number generator, hash, encryption, commitment, and signature.
Hash functions and ciphers are actually aggregated into a single category that is denoted symmetric primitive.
◦ Exchanged bits (slow phase). Number of exchanged bits during the slow phase(s).
◦ Exchanged bits (fast phase). Number of exchanged bits during the fast phase.
◦ Memory consumption. Amount of memory that is needed during the entire fast phase by the prover.
Table III: Properties
Property Value
Adaptiveness Yes/No
Mutual authentication Yes/No/Optional
Second slow phase Yes/No
Independence of the rounds Yes/No
Table IV: Performance
Performance Value
Cryptographic primitives Type
Exchanged bits (slow phase) bits
Exchanged bits (fast phase) bits
Memory consumption bits
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3. BRANDS AND CHAUM’S PROTOCOL (1993)
In 1993, Brands and Chaum designed several distance-bounding protocols [Brands and Chaum 1993]. This
analysis focuses on their protocol (Algorithm 1) that mitigates both mafia and distance frauds.
Algorithm 1: Brands and Chaum’s Protocol
Verifier Prover
(prover’s public key Kv) (prover’s private key Ks)
Commit(m1|| . . . ||mn)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− mi ∈R {0, 1}[
Pick ci ∈R {0, 1} and Start Timer
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Stop Timer
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ri = mi ⊕ ci
Open(Commit), SignKs
(c1||r1|| . . .)
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Check ri and ∆ti ≤ tmax for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
then Verify SignKs
3.1. Impersonation
Assuming that the signature scheme is secure, impersonating the prover can only be done by sending a ran-
domly selected correct signature. Such a naive attack has the success probability: PrImp = (1/2)ℓ. However,
while nonce-based replay attacks are not addressed in this paper (Section 2.1), a challenge-based replay
attack should be considered. Indeed, if the challenges sent by the verifier are used twice, then the adver-
sary can reuse the same mi’s and thus has the correct Open(Commit) and SignKs(c1||r1|| . . . ||cn||rn). After
eavesdropping one execution before the attack, the success probability becomes PrImp = (1/2)n.
3.2. Mafia Fraud
◦ Pre-ask strategy. The adversary gets the commitment and queries the prover with random bits (ci) during
the fast phase. The adversary then receives the responses (ri) and the final signature. With this information,
the adversary simply computes mi = ci ⊕ ri, then sends the valid responses to the verifier during the fast
phase, and finally the commitment and the signature during the second slow phase. However, the signature
received from the prover is not valid for this protocol run, except if the challenges sent by the adversary to
the prover and the challenges sent by the verifier to the adversary are the same. The success probability of
this strategy is the probability of guessing the challenges correctly: PrMF|pre =
(
1
2
)n
[Avoine et al. 2011].
Table V: Parameters and functions (Algorithm 1)
n Number of iterations in the fast phase
ℓ Lower bound for the size of the commitment and the signature (ℓ >> n)
tmax Threshold of the round-trip time
Commit Secure commitment function that outputs ℓ bits
SignKs Signature function whose private key is Ks
◦ Post-ask strategy. The adversary must predict the correct responses to be sent to the verifier during the
fast phase without any assistance. We thus have: PrMF|post =
(
1
2
)n
.
3.3. Distance Fraud (White Box)
◦ Early-reply strategy with one run. Given that the adversary must predict the current challenge correctly
beforehand, her success probability is: PrDF|WB(1)|early =
(
1
2
)n
[Avoine et al. 2011].
◦ Early-reply strategy with p runs. No cryptographic function is used to compute registers, contrary to Hancke
and Kuhn’s approach. This fact trivially yields: PrDF|WB(p)|early = PrDF|WB(1)|early.
◦ Circle strategy. Rounds being independent, the circle analysis oﬀers no benefit to an adversary.
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3.4. Distance Fraud (Black Box)
◦ Pre-ask combined with early-reply strategy. With the pre-ask strategy, the adversary learns all the possible
answers. However, she does not know the challenges, so when she sends her answers in advance, two cases
occur: a) the verifier uses the same challenge as she did with the verifier. Therefore she always succeeds, b)
the verifier picks another challenge and she has sent an incorrect answer to the verifier. Hence, the success
probability of this strategy is: PrDF|BB|pre&early =
(
1
2
)n
.
◦ Post-ask combined with early-reply strategy. Given that the adversary must commit during the first slow
phase, she cannot just answer randomly during the fast phase and she will therefore need to predict the
responses expected by the verifier. Hence we have: PrDF|BB|post&early =
(
1
2
)n
.
◦ Circle strategy. We previously stressed that the circle analysis is worthless for this protocol.
3.5. Terrorist Fraud (White Box)
This protocol is not designed to resist to the terrorist fraud in the white box model. Indeed, the prover
without revealing his secret Ks, is able to provide to his accomplice the commitment and the signature,
which are required to succeed. Consequently: PrTF|WB = 1 [Kim et al. 2008].
4. CˇAPKUN, BUTTYA´N, AND HUBAUX’S PROTOCOL (2003)
In 2003, Cˇapkun, Buttya´n, and Hubaux introduced MAD [Cˇapkun et al. 2003], a protocol that works quite
similarly to the BC protocol [Brands and Chaum 1993], but provides mutual authentication. Although
denoted by P and V , the two parties act as both prover and verifier during the execution of the protocol
(Algorithm 2). The notations used in [Cˇapkun et al. 2003] are kept in the description below.
Algorithm 2: MAD Protocol
Prover Verifier
(secret K) (secret K)
Pick r′ ∈R {0, 1}
δ and r ∈R {0, 1}
n Pick s′ ∈R {0, 1}
δ and s ∈R {0, 1}
n
h(r||r′)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
h(s||s′)
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
α1 = r1
Start Timer
α1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
β1 = s1 ⊕ α1
Stop Timer
β1←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Start timer
.
.
.
αi = ri ⊕ βi−1
Start Timer
αi−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Stop timer
βi = si ⊕ αi
Stop Timer
βi←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Start timer
.
.
.
αn = rn ⊕ βn−1
Start Timer
αn−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Stop timer
βn = sn ⊕ αn
Stop Timer
βn←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Compute si = αi ⊕ βi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n Compute r1 = α1, ri = αi ⊕ βi−1 for i > 1
and µP =
MACK(IDP ||IDV ||r1||s1|| . . . ||rn||sn)
and µV = MACK(IDV ||IDP ||s1||r1|| . . . ||sn||rn)
r′||µP−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
s′||µV←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Verify h(s||s′) and µV Verify h(r||r
′) and µP
Check ∆ti ≤ tmax for 1 ≤ i ≤ n Check ∆ti ≤ tmax for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
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4.1. Impersonation
The basic way to impersonate the prover is to generate the random numbers r and r′, and to complete the
first slow phase and the fast phase. The adversary must then guess the output of the MAC function in the
second slow phase. The probability of a correct guess is: PrImp =
(
1
2
)σ
.
4.2. Mafia Fraud
Without loss of generality, we assume that the adversary seeks to impersonate P against V .
◦ Pre-ask strategy. To succeed in the mafia fraud, the output of the MAC function in the second slow phase
needs to be valid. Since the adversary cannot compute this value, she needs to ensure that P sends the
correct output of the MAC function to V . This will only be the case if the adversary has guessed the values
si correctly during the pre-ask stage. Hence: PrMF|pre =
(
1
2
)n
[Cˇapkun et al. 2003].
◦ Post-ask strategy. Similarly, the adversary needs to ensure that P sends the correct output of MACK . This
will only be the case if she guessed all correct ri values in advance: PrMF|post =
(
1
2
)n
[Cˇapkun et al. 2003].
4.3. Distance Fraud (White Box)
Without loss of generality, we assume that P wants to perform a distance fraud (the distance fraud success
probability of V is equal to the one of P ).
◦ Early-reply strategy with one run. The responses αi are computed by XORing the values of the responses ri,
which are completely controlled by the adversary, and the challenges βi. The latter are uniformly distributed,
and the values αi inherit the same statistical distribution. So even if the adversary fully controls her hardware,
the best strategy is to guess the challenges βi in advance. We have thus: PrDF|WB(1)|early =
(
1
2
)n
.
◦ Early-reply strategy with p runs. Similarly to Algorithm 1, no cryptographic function is used to compute
registers, and so: PrDF|WB(p)|early = PrDF|WB(1)|early.
◦ Circle strategy. The rounds of the MAD protocol are not independent, so the circle analysis should be
applied. Assuming that P knows the challenges of the first i − 1 rounds, but not the challenge βi, P must
compute the response αi+1 without knowing βi in order to perform a successful distance fraud. However, the
rounds are dependent and the following equation holds: βi = si⊕αi. Therefore, P can compute the response
αi+1 as follows: αi+1 = ri+1 ⊕ si ⊕ αi. In this equation, everything is known except the value si, which is
uniformly distributed. Consequently, P has only probability of 1/2 to compute αi+1 correctly. As a result,
P does not gain any advantage by knowing the challenges and responses of the previous rounds.
4.4. Distance Fraud (Black Box)
We assume that the fraudulent party that performs the distance fraud is P .
◦ Pre-ask combined with early-reply strategy. The best strategy consists in guessing the n challenges βi. By
querying itself in advance, the prover learns the values ri, and computes the responses αi. The adversary
uses these responses in the early-reply strategy. They are correct when the values βi were guessed correctly
and consequently the MAC computed by the prover in the second slow phase is correct as well. If one of the
challenges is guessed incorrectly, the prover will compute incorrect values si, and MACK(.) will be wrong.
The distance fraud success probability is: PrDF|BB|pre&early =
(
1
2
)n
.
◦ Post-ask combined with early-reply strategy. The adversary has no information on the bits ri. The best
strategy is to send n random responses αi. In each round, the adversary has a 1/2 probability of being
successful. This occurs when both ri and βi are guessed correctly, or when both guesses were wrong. When
one of these values is correct and the other one is incorrect, the response of the adversary will be wrong. As
a result, the distance fraud success probability is: PrDF|BB|post&early =
(
1
2
)n
.
◦ Circle strategy. The rounds of the MAD protocol are not independent, so the circle analysis can be applied.
However, as already demonstrated in the white box case, P does not gain any advantage by knowing the
challenges and responses of the previous rounds.
4.5. Terrorist Fraud (White Box)
This protocol is not designed to resist to the terrorist fraud in the white box model. Indeed, the prover
without revealing her secret K, gives her accomplice the output of the commitment, and the values αi and
r′, or βi and s′. After the fast phase, the accomplice gives the observed values si or ri to the prover, who
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can then computes the MAC. This output is then sent back to the accomplice, who finally forwards it to the
verifier. Hence: PrTF|WB = 1 [Kim et al. 2008].
5. HANCKE AND KUHN’S PROTOCOL (2005)
In 2005 Hancke and Kuhn published the first distance-bounding protocol [Hancke and Kuhn 2005] (Algo-
rithm 3) clearly dedicated to RFID. The protocol relies on the original ideas of Desmedt et al. [Desmedt
et al. 1988; Bengio et al. 1991] but is diﬀerent from Brands and Chaum’s work [Brands and Chaum 1993] in
the sense that Hancke and Kuhn’s protocol does not have any final signature after the fast phase.
Algorithm 3: Hancke and Kuhn’s Protocol
Verifier Prover
(secret K) (secret K)
Pick NV ∈R {0, 1}
δ Pick NP ∈R {0, 1}
δ
NV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
NP←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
H = h(K,NV , NP )
R0 = H1 ||H2 || . . . ||Hn
R1 = Hn+1||Hn+2|| . . . ||H2n
H = h(K,NV , NP )
R0 = H1 ||H2 || . . . ||Hn
R1 = Hn+1||Hn+2|| . . . ||H2n[
Pick ci ∈ {0, 1} and Start Timer
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Stop Timer
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ri = R
ci
i
Check correctness of ri
and ∆ti ≤ tmax for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
5.1. Impersonation
The common attack consists in guessing all the answers during the fast phase: PrImp =
(
1
2
)n
.
5.2. Mafia Fraud
◦ Pre-ask strategy. We have: PrMF|pre =
(
3
4
)n
[Hancke and Kuhn 2005].
◦ Post-ask strategy. This protocol does not contain any second slow phase and the first slow phase consists
of nonce exchanges only. As per Section 2 we have: PrMF|post = PrImp.
5.3. Distance Fraud (White Box)
◦ Early-reply strategy with one run. We have: PrDF|WB(1)|early =
(
3
4
)n
[Trujillo-Rasua et al. 2010].
◦ Early-reply strategy with p runs. The formula expressing the attack success probability for this strategy
was originally presented in [Avoine et al. 2011], but it contained a typing error. The correct formula is:
PrDF|WB(p)|early =
1
2pn
·
⎛⎝i=n−1∑
i=0
(
1
2
)i
·
⎡⎣⎛⎝j=n∑
j=i
(
n
j
)⎞⎠p −
⎛⎝ j=n∑
j=i+1
(
n
j
)⎞⎠p⎤⎦+ (1
2
)n⎞⎠ .
◦ Circle strategy. Rounds being independent, the circle analysis oﬀers no benefit to an adversary.
5.4. Distance Fraud (Black Box)
◦ Pre-ask combined with early-reply strategy. With the pre-ask strategy, the adversary learns half of the
possible responses. However, she does not know the challenge, so when she sends her responses in advance,
two situations can occur: 1) the verifier asks her the same challenge that she asked the prover and therefore
her response is correct, 2) the verifier sends a diﬀerent challenge in which case she succeeds if the two possible
responses were the same, i.e., her response is the same as the alternative response, and fails if the possible
responses are diﬀerent. Hence, the distance fraud success probability is: PrDF|BB|pre&early =
(
3
4
)n
◦ Post-ask combined with early-reply strategy. This protocol does not contain any second slow phase and the
first slow phase consists of nonce exchanges only. As per Section 2 we have: PrDF|BB|post&early = PrImp.
◦ Circle strategy. We previously stressed that the circle analysis is worthless for this protocol.
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5.5. Terrorist Fraud (White Box)
This protocol is not designed to resist to the terrorist fraud in the white box model. Indeed, the prover is
able to provide to his accomplice the two registers required to successfully execute the protocol, without
revealing his secret K: PrTF|WB = 1 [Kim et al. 2008].
6. BUSSARD AND BAGGA’S PROTOCOL (2005)
Bussard and Bagga published the DBPK-Log protocol (Algorithm 4), which is a distance-bounding protocol
based on a proof of knowledge and a commitment scheme [Bussard and Bagga 2005].
Algorithm 4: DBPK-Log Protocol
Verifier Prover
(prover’s public key y) (prover’s private key x)
Pick R0 ∈R {0, 1}
n
Compute R1 = ER0 (x) = x− R
0 mod (p− 1)
Compute ∀i ∈ [0, n− 1]:
Ci(R
0) = Commit(R0i )
Ci(R
1) = Commit(R1i )
∀i, Ci(R
0)Ci(R
1)
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−[
Pick ci ∈ {0, 1} and Start Timer
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Stop Timer
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ri = R
ci
i
Check ri = R
ci
i
Open(R
ci
i
)
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
PK[(x, v) : z = Ω(x, v) ∧ y = Γ(x)]
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
6.1. Impersonation
In [Bussard and Bagga 2005], the authors described a statistical key recovery attack. They established the
success probability of this attack: PrImp = (1/2)−4m
′
.
6.2. Mafia Fraud
◦ Pre-ask strategy. The adversary must pass the final slow phase to defeat the protocol. Forging the Open
function is definitely not the best option. Instead the adversary should try to send the correct challenges to
the prover during the pre-ask attack, and then relay the final slow phases. Her success probability with such
a strategy is: PrMF|pre = (1/2)
n.
◦ Post-ask strategy. Due to the presence of a complex second slow phase, the post-ask strategy is as good as
the pre-ask strategy against DBPK-Log. Indeed, when the adversary correctly guesses the responses expected
by the verifier, she can apply the post-ask strategy and bypass the second slow phase. Thus, she needs only
to succeed in the fast phase, which yields the success probability: PrMF|post = (1/2)
n.
6.3. Distance Fraud (White Box)
◦ Early-reply strategy with one run. The adversary can search for a random R0 that minimizes the Hamming
distance between R0 and R1. Denoting a as the Hamming distance between R0 and R1 (a = dH(R0, R1)),
we have: PrDF|WB(1)|early = (1/2)
a. This points out that the analysis provided in [Bussard and Bagga 2005]
under-evaluates the success probability of the adversary because the white box model is not considered.
Example 6.1. Let us consider the safe prime p = 59 (q = 29 and n = 6) and x = 27. If R0 = 32, then
dH(R0, R1) = 1 and so the success probability is (1/2).
◦ Early-reply strategy with p runs. Running the pseudo-random generator for choosing R0 once, or several
times, has no impact in the protocol security: the malicious prover can choose an appropriate value for R0 in
order to maximize its success probability in the distance fraud. Hence: PrDF|WB(p)|early = PrDF|WB(1)|early.
◦ Circle strategy. Rounds being independent, the circle analysis oﬀers no benefit to an adversary.
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6.4. Distance Fraud (Black Box)
◦ Pre-ask combined with early-reply strategy. The adversary must succeed in the second slow phase and has
the same success probability as the Mafia Fraud. We then have: PrDF|BB|pre&early = (1/2)
n.
◦ Post-ask combined with early-reply strategy. The adversary must succeed in the fast phase without the
knowledge of the challenge. Then, the prover is queried by the adversary to gain information for the final
slow phase. Similar to the mafia fraud, the success probability is: PrDF|BB|post&early = (1/2)
n.
◦ Circle strategy. We previously stressed that the circle analysis is worthless for this protocol.
6.5. Terrorist Fraud (White Box)
◦ Early-provide strategy with one run. This protocol is designed to resist to terrorist fraud in the white box
model. Indeed, the prover cannot reveal R0 and R1 without exposing the key, making him able to provide
only R0 or R1 to the external adversary. Note that the prover cannot try to optimize the Hamming distance
between R0 and R1 as in the distance fraud. Indeed the knowledge of one register and the procedure to
choose it reveals some information on the key.
Remark 6.2. The probability of terrorist fraud calculated in [Bussard and Bagga 2005] is lower than the
one provided here. Indeed, the authors considers that the final slow phase cannot be relayed by the adversary.
◦ Early-provide strategy with p runs. Similarly to the distance fraud strategy with early provide one run, we
have PrTF|WB(p) = PrTF|WB(1).
! A Dedicated Distance Fraud and Terrorist Fraud. We describe here a distance fraud from [Bay et al. 2012]. The
key idea is that a malicious prover could select R0 ≈ x2 mod (p − 1). That is, if x is even, he takes R0 = x2
and gets R1 = R0. Otherwise, he takes R0 = x±12 and get R
1 = R0 ± 1 so that R0 and R1 diﬀer in their
least significant bit only. He can then run the protocol normally. We note that R0i = R
1
i except for one single
round. So, the answers to the received challenges do not depend on it, except in one round. By sending the
answer before the challenge arrives, the malicious prover can succeed in an early-reply strategy to run a
distance fraud with a success probability larger than 12 .
The paper [Bay et al. 2012] also describes a terrorist fraud. The idea of the attack is that the malicious
prover starts the protocol but does not give the commit values. Instead, he computes z and discloses it to
the adversary through an early-provide strategy. The adversary will commit to random bits for R0i and R
1
i
except for round i = 1. Then, he guesses the value c1 and commit to a random bit for R
c1
1 . Finally, the
commit value for R1−c11 is adjusted so that the equation z =
∏n
i=1(Ci(R
0)Ci(R1))2
i−1
mod p holds. Clearly,
the adversary can answer all challenges (if his guess for c1 is correct), since he knows the bits he committed
to. Next, he can get the help of the malicious prover to run the PK protocol through the lazy phase. Due to
the zero-knowledge property of the PK protocol, this leaks no information about x. This attack works with
probability 12 (due to the guess of c1).
Finally, the paper [Bay et al. 2012] proposes some man-in-the-middle attacks against variants of this
protocol which are not using public-key cryptography, i.e., where PK is not used and x is shared.
7. MUNILLA AND PEINADO’S PROTOCOL (2006)
Munilla and Peinado introduced in [Munilla et al. 2006; Munilla and Peinado 2009] the concept of void
challenges as a tool to improve distance-bounding protocols. These void challenges can also be used to
decrease the mafia fraud success probability when applied to Hancke and Kuhn’s protocol [Munilla and
Peinado 2008a], which is the case analysed in this section. Thus, for this protocol (Algorithm 5), the challenges
can be 0, 1 or void, where a void challenge means that no challenge is sent. Void challenges are used to detect
a mafia fraud using the pre-ask strategy.
7.1. Impersonation
The adversary must guess the responses to the non-void challenges and the signature. Hence:
PrImp = (1− pf
2
)n · (1
2
)3n
7.2. Mafia Fraud
◦ Pre-ask strategy. The calculation of the success probability of the pre-ask strategy is:
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Algorithm 5: Munilla and Peinado’s Protocol
Verifier Prover
(secret K) (secret K)
Pick a random NV Pick a random NP
NV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
NP←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
H = h(K,NV , NP )
Z = H1 ||H2 || . . . ||Hn
R0 = Hn+1||Hn+2|| . . . ||H2n
R1 = H2n+1||H2n+2|| . . . ||H3n
H = h(K,NV , NP )
Z = H1 ||H2 || . . . ||Hn
R0 = Hn+1||Hn+2|| . . . ||H2n
R1 = H2n+1||H2n+2|| . . . ||H3n⎡⎢⎢⎣
If Zi = 1: Pick ci ∈R {0, 1} and Start Timer
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
If ci ̸= void and Zi = 1 then ri = R
ci
i
Elseif ci = void and Zi = 0 then send no
response, Else abort the protocol
Stop Timer
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
h(K,R0, R1)
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Check correctness of ri and ∆ti ≤ tmax
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and verify h(K,R0, R1)
PrMF|pre =
⎧⎨⎩
(
1− pf
)n
if pf < 4/7(
pf · 3
4
)n
if pf ≥ 4/7
[Avoine et al. 2011]
Note that PrMF|pre calculated in [Avoine et al. 2011] and provided above is an approximation of the real
value. Indeed, once the adversary is detected by the device, she does not receive any useful information any
more. However, she can still guess the correct answers to be sent to the verifier. Given that being detected by
the device forces the adversary to guess the final signature, this case is nevertheless negligible (Section 2.1).
Note that the security of the signature depends on the length of 3n though, which implies that this case
should not be disregarded when n is particularly small.
◦ Post-ask strategy. The adversary must predict the correct responses to the non-void challenges. We so have:
PrMF|post =
(
1− pf
2
)n
. [Avoine et al. 2011]
Remark 7.1 (Best strategy). The best strategy is post-ask when pf < 4/5, and pre-ask when pf > 4/5.
7.3. Distance Fraud (White Box)
◦ Early-reply strategy with one run. When the challenge is not void, the adversary can correctly respond to
the verifier with probability 1 if R0i = R
1
i , and with probability 1/2 if R
0
i ̸= R1i . Consequently:
PrDF|WB(1)|early =
(
1− pf
4
)n
. [Avoine et al. 2011]
◦ Early-reply strategy with p runs. This strategy is eﬃcient against the protocol if the verifier sends his nonce
first. This weakness can be easily fixed though. The success probability is provided in [Avoine et al. 2011]:
PrDF|WB(p)|early =
(
(1− pf ) + pf ·
(
1− 1
2
· E(dH(v
0, v1))
n
))n
where E(dH(R0, R1)) is the expected minimum Hamming distance between R0 and R1 for the non-void
challenges after the hash function is run p times with a diﬀerent NP . We have: lim[PrDF|WB(p)|early] = 1
p→∞
.
◦ Circle strategy. Rounds being independent, the circle analysis oﬀers no benefit to an adversary.
7.4. Distance Fraud (Black Box)
◦ Pre-ask combined with early-reply strategy. With the pre-ask strategy in the black box model, the adversary
carries out an attack similar to the mafia fraud but on its own device: PrDF|BB|pre&early ≈ PrMF|pre. The
approximation is due to a small diﬀerence in the two frauds as explained hereafter. As long as the adversary
is not detected by the device, she has the same strategy (and same probability of success) in both mafia
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fraud and distance fraud. In particular, she no longer receives useful information from the device once she
is detected. However, in the mafia fraud, she can still determine whether or not a round contains a void
challenge when communicating with the verifier, as she does not have time to get this information in the
distance fraud. The diﬀerence is however negligible because she has to guess the final signature in both cases.
◦ Post-ask combined with early-reply strategy. In this strategy, the adversary definitely obtains the correct
final signature. However, she does not know when a void challenge or a non-void challenge is expected.
Therefore, if the probability of a non-void challenge is lower (resp. higher) than 2/3 then her best strategy
is to keep quiet (resp. try to guess every response, with probability 1/2).
PrDF|BB|post&early =
⎧⎨⎩
(
1− pf
)n
if pf < 2/3(pf
2
)n
if pf ≥ 2/3
[Avoine et al. 2011]
◦ Circle strategy. We previously stressed that the circle analysis is worthless for this protocol.
Remark 7.2. In this case, the pre-ask strategy has the best success probability.
7.5. Terrorist Fraud (White Box)
This protocol is not designed to resist to the terrorist fraud in the white box model. Indeed, the prover,
without revealing his secret K, is able to provide to his accomplice the two registers required to successfully
complete the protocol. We so have: PrTF|WB = 1 [Avoine et al. 2011].
7.6. Published Attacks
A technique to reduce the required memory [Munilla et al. 2006] consists in using only one (n+1)-bit register,
where the responses are selected from the two edges. However, [Avoine et al. 2011] demontrated that this
technique opens the door to an attack where the adversary queries in advance the two values of the edges.
8. KIM, AVOINE, KOEUNE, STANDAERT AND PEREIRA’S PROTOCOL (2008)
Kim, Avoine, Koeune, Standaert and Pereira introduced a protocol in [Kim et al. 2008] known as the Swiss-
knife distance-bounding protocol2 (Algorithm 6). We only consider in this analysis the case where T = 1,
that is when the protocol is not noise-resilient.
8.1. Impersonation
The attacker could impersonate the prover by guessing all the answers during the fast phase and TB in the
second slow phase. To succeed the adversary would need to guess σ + n bits. Therefore, it is better for the
adversary to guess K which size is σ. Consequently, we have: PrImp =
(
1
2
)σ
.
8.2. Mafia Fraud
◦ Pre-ask strategy. The success probability of the pre-ask strategy is PrMF|pre =
(
1
2
)n
[Kim et al. 2008].
◦ Post-ask strategy. The adversary must guess the responses expected in the fast phase: PrMF|post =
(
1
2
)n
.
8.3. Distance Fraud (White Box)
◦ Early-reply strategy with one run. As the prover can access to the internal state of the registers, she knows
the content of two the registers. If v0i = v
1
i , she always responds correctly, otherwise she has to guess the
correct answer with probability 12 . Hence, PrDF|WB(1)|early =
(
3
4
)n
.
◦ Early-reply strategy with p runs. The Swiss-knife Protocol generates only one register. Hence, multiple-run
of PRF does not increase the adversary success probability: PrDF|WB(p)|early = PrDF|WB(1)|early.
◦ Circle strategy. Rounds being independent, the circle analysis oﬀers no benefit to an adversary.
2Like Swiss-army knives used during WWII, the Swiss-knife protocol is a multi-purpose tool. The authors claim their protocol
“resists against both mafia fraud and terrorist attacks, reaches the best known false acceptance rate, preserves privacy, resists
to channel errors, uses symmetric-key cryptography only, requires no more than 2 cryptographic operations to be performed by
the tag, can take advantage of precomputation on the tag, and oﬀers an optional mutual authentication” [Kim et al. 2008].
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Algorithm 6: Swiss-knife Protocol
Verifier Prover
(secret K, constant C) (secret K, identifier ID, constant C)
Pick NV ∈R {0, 1}
δ Pick NP ∈R {0, 1}
δ
Pick a random D s.t. H(D) = n a = fK(C,NP )
Z0 = a, Z1 = a⊕K
NV ,D−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
For i = 1 to n:
j = index of the next “1” in the binary
representation of D. R0i = Z
0
j , R
1
i = Z
1
j
NP←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−[
Pick ci ∈R {0, 1} and Start Timer
c′i−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Stop Timer
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ri = R
c′i
i
TB, c
′
1, . . . , c
′
n←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− TB = fK(c
′
1, . . . , c
′
n, ID,NV , NP )
Check ID via DB
Compute R0, R1
Compute errC := ♯{i : ci ̸= c
′
i},
errR := ♯{i : ci = c
′
i ∧ ri ̸= vi
ci},
errT := ♯{i : ci = c
′
i ∧∆ti > tmax}.
If errC + errR + errT ≥ T , then REJECT
TA = fK(NB)
TA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Compute and check TA
8.4. Distance Fraud (Black Box)
◦ Pre-ask combined with early-reply strategy. The adversary sends her own challenges to the prover in advance.
To obtain the correct signature in the second slow phase, the challenges sent by the adversary must be the
same as the challenges sent by the verifier. We consequently have: PrDF|BB|pre&early =
(
1
2
)n
.
◦ Post-ask combined with early-reply strategy. The adversary has to correctly guess the response in each
round. Hence: PrDF|BB|post&early =
(
1
2
)n
.
◦ Circle strategy. We previously stressed that the circle analysis is worthless for this protocol.
8.5. Terrorist Fraud (White Box)
◦ Early-provide strategy with one run. PrTF|WB(1) =
(
3
4
)n
[Kim et al. 2008].
◦ Early-provide strategy with p runs. For the same reason as Section 8.3: PrTF|WB(p) = PrTF|WB(1).
8.6. Published Attacks
Peris-Lopez et al. proposed a passive full disclosure attack on the Swiss-knife RFID distance-bounding
protocol [Peris-Lopez et al. 2009]. However, their assumption is not correct: they assume that the size of the
secret key (K) and random nonces (NV and NP ) are equal to n (number of iterations in the fast phase)
and n is insecurely short, for example 32 bits or less in the Swiss-knife protocol. Based on this assumption,
they assert that the Swiss-knife protocol is insecure. The authors of the Swiss-knife RFID distance-bounding
protocol never claimed that their protocol is secure when the size of the long-term key and random nonces
are so short. Under this assumption, all the distance-bounding protocols can be broken.
9. AVOINE AND TCHAMKERTEN’S PROTOCOL (2009)
The protocol (Algorithm 7) introduced by Avoine and Tchamkerten in [Avoine and Tchamkerten 2009] is a
generalization of Hancke and Kuhn’s protocol that is more secure in terms of mafia and distance frauds.
9.1. Impersonation
To impersonate a legitimate prover one needs to guess the c authentication bits and the n replies of the fast
phase. Hence: PrImp =
(
1
2
)c+n
.
9.2. Mafia Fraud
◦ Pre-ask strategy. PrMF|pre = 2−n(d2 +1)
n
d = 2−d·ℓ(d2 +1)
ℓ with n = dℓ [Avoine and Tchamkerten 2009].
21
Algorithm 7: Tree-based Protocol
Verifier Prover
(secret K) (secret K)
Pick NV ∈R {0, 1}
δ Pick NP ∈R {0, 1}
δ
Compute hK(NV , NP ) Compute hK(NV , NP )
NV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
NP , [hK (NV ,NP )]
c
1←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Labelization of the ℓ trees Labelization of the ℓ trees[
Pick ci ∈ {0, 1}
Start Timer
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Stop Timer
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ri
Check correctness of ri’s and
if ∆i ≤ tmax for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
◦ Post-ask strategy. Without any final slow phase, a post-ask strategy is useless: PrMF|post =
(
1
2
)c+n
.
9.3. Distance Fraud (White Box)
◦ Early-reply strategy with one run. The analysis of the distance fraud probability in the case of the tree-based
protocol is very similar to the analysis of the Poulidor protocol (Section 11) that is provided in [Trujillo-Rasua
et al. 2010]. Unfortunately, this analysis only yields rough upper bounds. To find such an upper bound on the
adversary success probability for distance fraud for the tree-based protocol, Theorem 3 available in [Trujillo-
Rasua et al. 2010] is used. This theorem is related to Poulidor but the only diﬀerence between Poulidor and
the tree-based protocol is that the latter creates a full tree as graph. Therefore, the distance fraud success
probability of the tree-based protocol is upper bounded by:
1
2
(
1
2n
+
√
1
22n
− 4
2n
+ 4q
)
where q =
i=n∏
i=1
(
1
2
+
1
22i+1
k=2n−1∑
k=0
(Ai[0, k])2
)
.
The authors of [Trujillo-Rasua et al. 2010] define Ai[0, k] for a tree, considering that the nodes in the tree
are labeled between 0 and 2n − 1 using a breadth-first algorithm, then:
Ai[0, k] =
{
1 if 2i − 1 ≤ k < 2i+1 − 1,
0 otherwise, and finally: q =
i=n∏
i=1
(
1
2
+
1
2i+1
)
.
◦ Early-reply strategy with p runs. Similar to the Poulidor case (Section 11), this strategy makes sense for
this protocol but so far neither PrDF|WB(1)|early nor PrDF|WB(p)|early have been calculated.
◦ Circle strategy. Although it makes sense to consider the circle analysis for this protocol, the calculation of
the distance fraud success probability in this scenario is also an open problem. Indeed, when the number of
circles is greater than n, this problem is as hard as the calculation of PrDF|WB(1)|early.
9.4. Distance Fraud (Black Box)
◦ Pre-ask combined with early-reply strategy. PrDF|BB|pre&early = 2−n(d2+1)
n
d [Avoine and Tchamkerten 2009]
◦ Post-ask combined with early-reply strategy. Note that the post-ask strategy will not allow the adversary
to gain any information, i.e., PrDF|BB|post&early =
(
1
2
)c+n
.
◦ Circle strategy. Since we are in a black box setting, the prover does not have access to the labeling of the
trees, hence the circle strategy yields probability of success of
(
1
2
)n
.
9.5. Terrorist Fraud (White Box)
This protocol is not designed to resist to the terrorist fraud in the white box model. An attacker can reveal
the tree node labelization to an accomplice who so successfully passes the fast phase with PrTF|WB = 1.
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10. RASMUSSEN AND CˇAPKUN’S PROTOCOL (2010)
The protocol (Algorithm 8) was introduced by Rasmussen and Cˇapkun and originally appeared in [Rasmussen
and Cˇapkun 2010]. In this paper we consider the updated version that appeared in [Rasmussen 2011].
Algorithm 8: RC Protocol
Verifier Prover
Commit(NP , IDP )←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Pick a random NP
Pick a random NV[
Start Timer
NV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Stop Timer
CRCS(NV ,NP )←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
From channels extract N ′P Measure delay n
From signal extract N ′V
From signal extract delay n′
Sign(M)
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− M = Commit(NP , IDP )||n||IDV ||NP ||NV
Verify {∆t, n = n′,
N ′V = NV , N
′
P = NP ,
Sign(M)}
10.1. Impersonation
We assume here that key size and nonce size are large enough to ensure that the probability of a key-recovery
attack and a replay attack are negligible. The easiest manner to impersonate a prover is by forging the final
signature. The success probability of this attack is: PrImp =
(
1
2
)σ
.
10.2. Mafia Fraud
◦ Pre-ask strategy. In order to implement a mafia fraud using a pre-ask strategy an attacker has to guess
the nonce NV of the verifier. Otherwise the final signature will not be valid. So, PrMF|pre =
(
1
2
)δV .
◦ Post-ask strategy. An attacker wishing to execute a mafia fraud attack must guess all the bits of the prover’s
nonce in order to be able to reply correctly. Thus, PrMF|post =
(
1
2
)δP .
10.3. Distance Fraud (White Box)
◦ Early-reply strategy with one run. A malicious prover wishing to execute a distance fraud attack must
guess all the bits of the verifier’s nonce to reply correctly. Hence: PrDF|WB(1)|early =
(
1
2
)δV [Rasmussen 2011].
◦ Early-reply strategy with p runs. The concept of round does not exist in this protocol, therefore:
PrDF|WB(p)|early = PrDF|WB(1)|early.
◦ Circle strategy. The concept of rounds does not exist in this protocol.
10.4. Distance Fraud (Black Box)
The security of this protocol does not depend on a well behaved prover. Consequently black-box success
probabilities are the same as in the white-box model.
10.5. Terrorist Fraud (White Box)
This protocol is not designed to resist to the terrorist fraud in the white box model. Indeed, the prover
without revealing his secret K, is able to provide his accomplice with NP , which is required to successfully
execute the fast phase. Hence, PrTF|WB = 1.
11. TRUJILLO-RASUA, MARTIN AND AVOINE’S PROTOCOL (2010)
Poulidor, the graph-based distance-bounding protocol (Algorithm 9) designed by Trujillo-Rasua, Martin,
and Avoine [Trujillo-Rasua et al. 2010], uses specific node and edge dependencies in the tree of the AT
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protocol [Avoine and Tchamkerten 2009] – which then can alternatively be represented by an acyclic graph.
Poulidor benefits from a lower memory requirement compared to the AT protocol. Security is also reduced.
Algorithm 9: Poulidor Protocol
Verifier Prover
(secret K) (secret K)
Pick a random NV ∈R {0, 1}
δ Pick a random NP ∈R {0, 1}
δ
NV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
NP←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
H1 . . . H4n = h(K,NP , NV )
Fill the graph:
for i = 0 to 2n− 1:{
ℓi = Hi+2n+1 ⊕ 1
si = Hi+2n+1
qi = Hi+1
H1 . . . H4n = h(K,NP , NV )
Fill the graph:
for i = 0 to 2n− 1:{
ℓi = Hi+2n+1 ⊕ 1
si = Hi+2n+1
qi = Hi+1⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Pick ci ∈R {0, 1}
Start Timer
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Move from qpi to qpi+1
Stop Timer
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ri = qpi+1
Move from qvi to qvi+1
if ri ̸= qvi+1 then abort the protocol
Check that ∆ti ≤ tmax for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
11.1. Impersonation
We assume that nonce size and key size are large enough to ensure the negligibility of the success probability
for the key recovery and the replay attack. The common manner to impersonate a prover is by guessing all
the answers during the fast phase. Hence, we have: PrImp =
(
1
2
)n
.
11.2. Mafia Fraud
◦ Pre-ask strategy. Let g(i, j, k) = 12 + 12j+i−2k+2
∑t=2n−1
t=0
(
Aj−t[1, t]Ai−t[2, t] +Aj−k[2, t]Ai−k[1, t]
)
where A
is the adjacency matrix of the graph which represents the graph-based protocol [Trujillo-Rasua et al. 2010].
Also, let:
f(i, j, k) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1 if j < k and i = j,
1
2 if j < k and i ̸= j,
1
2 if j ≥ k and i < k,
g(i, j, k) if j ≥ k and i ≥ k.
We then have: PrMF|pre =
k=n∑
k=1
1
2k
⎛⎝j=n∏
j=k
max(f(1, j, k), · · · , f(n, j, k))
⎞⎠+ 1
2n
. [Trujillo-Rasua et al. 2010]
◦ Post-ask strategy. This protocol does not contain any second slow phase and the first slow phase consists
of nonce exchanges only. As per Section 2 we have: PrMF|post = PrImp.
11.3. Distance Fraud (White Box)
◦ Early-reply strategy with one run. PrDF|WB(1)|early is upper bounded by [Trujillo-Rasua et al. 2010]:
1
2
(
1
2n
+
√
1
22n
− 4
2n
+ 4q
)
where q =
i=n∏
i=1
(
1
2
+
1
22i+1
k=2n−1∑
k=0
(Ai[0, k])2
)
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Computing in a similar way than in [Trujillo-Rasua et al. 2010], we find the following relation for Ai[0, k]:
Ai[0, k] =
{ ( i
k−i
)
if i ≤ k ≤ 2i,
0 otherwise,
and finally: q =
i=n∏
i=1
(
1
2
+
(2i
i
)
22i+1
)
.
Remark that finding an exact value for PrDF|WB(1)|early is an NP-hard problem [Trujillo-Rasua 2013].
◦ Early-reply strategy with p runs. This strategy makes sense for this protocol, but so far, neither has been
computed PrDF|WB(1)|early nor can be computed PrDF|WB(p)|early.
◦ Circle strategy. Although it makes sense to consider the circle analysis for this protocol, the calculation of
the distance fraud success probability in this scenario is also an open problem. Indeed, when the number of
circles is greater than n, this problem is as hard as the calculation of PrDF|WB(1)|early.
11.4. Distance Fraud (Black Box)
◦ Pre-ask combined with early-reply strategy. With the pre-ask strategy, the adversary may learn the values
of a walk in the graph. Note that, this is exactly the same knowledge obtained for an adversary attempting
to perform a mafia fraud attack by using the pre-ask strategy. However, contrary to the mafia fraud attack,
the adversary does not receive any challenge from the verifier when she is performing a distance fraud attack.
We consequently have PrDF|BB|pre&early ≤ PrMF|pre. The equality of this equation holds when the adversary
actually receives every challenge before sending its corresponding response, i.e., when the adversary is in the
close vicinity of the verifier. Therefore, for this protocol the circle strategy makes sense. The closer to the
verifier the adversary is, the higher her probability of success is, but it is still upper-bounded by PrMF|pre.
◦ Post-ask combined with early-reply strategy. PrDF|BB|post&early = PrImp.
◦ Circle strategy. As explained above, the circle strategy makes sense for this protocol. Nevertheless, the
adversary’s success probability by using this strategy is upper-bounded by PrMF|pre.
11.5. Terrorist Fraud (White Box)
This protocol is not designed to resist to the terrorist fraud in the white box model. Indeed, the prover is
able, without revealing his secret K, to provide his accomplice with the graph required to successfully pass
thorough the protocol. Hence: PrTF|WB = 1.
12. KIM AND AVOINE’S PROTOCOL (KA2) (2011)
Kim and Avoine introduced in 2009 a distance-bounding protocol with mixed challenges [Kim and Avoine
2009], namely challenges known and challenges unknown in advance by the prover. Challenges known in
advance allow the prover to help the verifier to detect an attack, but these challenges also allow the prover
to perform a distance fraud. Kim and Avoine improved their protocol in 2011, yielding a new variant known
as KA2 [Kim and Avoine 2011], which is analyzed in this section (Algorithm 10).
12.1. Impersonation
Guessing the fast phase answers is enough to impersonate the prover: PrImp =
(
1
2
)n
.
12.2. Mafia Fraud
◦ Pre-ask strategy. PrMF|pre =
(
3
4
)n−α ( 1
2
)α
+ α
(
1
2
)n+1
[Kim and Avoine 2011].
◦ Post-ask strategy. This protocol does not contain any second slow phase and the first slow phase consists
of nonce exchanges only. As per Section 2 we have: PrMF|post = PrImp.
12.3. Distance Fraud (White Box)
◦ Early-reply strategy with one run. PrDF|WB(1)|early =
(
3
4
)n−α
[Kim and Avoine 2011].
◦ Early-reply strategy with p runs. The success probability in case of early-reply strategy with p runs of the
pseudo-random function is provided in [Avoine et al. 2011]:
PrDF|WB(p)|early =
1
2p(n−α)
·
⎛⎝i=n−α−1∑
i=0
(
1
2
)i
·
⎡⎣⎛⎝j=n−α∑
j=i
(
n− α
j
)⎞⎠p −
⎛⎝j=n−α∑
j=i+1
(
n− α
j
)⎞⎠p⎤⎦+ (1
2
)n⎞⎠ .
◦ Circle strategy. Rounds being independent, the circle analysis oﬀers no benefit to an adversary.
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Algorithm 10: KA2 Protocol
Verifier Prover
(secret K) (secret K)
Pick NV ∈R {0, 1}
δ Pick NP ∈R {0, 1}
δ
NV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
NP←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
H = h(K,NV , NP )
R0 = H1 ||H2 || . . . ||Hn
R1 = Hn+1||Hn+2|| . . . ||H2n−α
D = H2n−α+1||H2n−α+2|| . . . ||H2n
H = h(K,NV , NP )
R0 = H1 ||H2 || . . . ||Hn
R1 = Hn+1||Hn+2|| . . . ||H2n−α
D = H2n−α+1||H2n−α+2|| . . . ||H2n⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
For i = 1 to α, Assign ci = Di
Start Timer
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Stop Timer
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ri =
{
R0i , if ci = Di
Random, if ci ̸= Di(error detected)
After error detection, only send random
answers until the end of the protocol.[
For i = α+ 1 to n, Pick ci ∈ {0, 1}
Start Timer
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Stop Timer
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ri = R
ci
i
Check correctness of ri’s
and ∆ti ≤ tmax for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
12.4. Distance Fraud (Black Box)
◦ Pre-ask combined with early-reply strategy. As with the Mafia fraud with pre-ask strategy, the success
probability is PrDF|BB|pre&early = PrMF|pre.
◦ Post-ask combined with early-reply strategy. This protocol does not contain any second slow phase and the
first slow phase consists of nonce exchanges only. As per Section 2 we have: PrDF|BB|post&early = PrImp.
◦ Circle strategy. We previously stressed that the circle analysis is worthless for this protocol.
12.5. Terrorist Fraud (White Box)
This protocol is not designed to resist to the terrorist fraud in the white box model. The prover can give the
registers to his accomplice to successfully pass the protocol: PrTF|WB = 1.
13. YUM, KIM, HONG AND LEE’S PROTOCOL (2010)
Yum, Kim, Hon and Lee created a distance-bounding protocol with mutual authentication [Yum et al. 2011].
13.1. Impersonation
The only known way to succeed at the impersonation consists of guessing all the answers during the fast
phase, which leads to the probability PrImp =
(
1
2
)n
.
13.2. Mafia Fraud
◦ Pre-ask strategy. Avoine and Kim proposed a new attack that yields a higher adversary success proba-
bility [Avoine and Kim 2013]. Their attack depends on the probability of finding Di’s, PrD, which varies
according to the system parameters. Following this attack, the probability of the mafia fraud is:
PrMF|pre =
{
( 58 )
n +
∑n
i=1
1
4 · ( 58 )i−1 · ( 34 )n−i, if PrD = 1
( 12 )
n +
∑n
i=1
3
8 · ( 12 )i−1 · ( 58 )n−i, if PrD = 34
. [Avoine and Kim 2013]
◦ Post-ask strategy. This protocol does not contain any second slow phase and the first slow phase consists
of nonce exchanges only. As per Section 2 we have: PrMF|post = PrImp.
13.3. Distance Fraud (White Box)
◦ Early-reply strategy with one run. PrDF|WB(1)|early =
(
7
8
)n
[Yum et al. 2011].
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Algorithm 11: YKHL Protocol
User A User B
(secret K) (secret K)
Pick NA ∈R {0, 1}
δ Pick NB ∈R {0, 1}
δ
NA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
NB←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
H = h(K,NA, NB)
D = H1 ||H2 || . . . ||Hn
R0 = Hn+1||Hn+2|| . . . ||H2n
R1 = H2n+1||H2n+2|| . . . ||H3n
H = h(K,NA, NB)
D = H1 ||H2 || . . . ||Hn
R0 = Hn+1||Hn+2|| . . . ||H2n
R1 = H2n+1||H2n+2|| . . . ||H3n⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Case I: Di = 0 Pick ci ∈ {0, 1}
Start Timer
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Stop Timer
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ri =
{
R0i , if ci = 0
R1i , if ci = 1
If ri ̸= R
ci
i or collision is detected, If collision is detected,
If ri ̸= R
ci
i or collision is detected, B enters into the protection mode.
Case II: Di = 1 Pick ci ∈ {0, 1}
ci←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Start Timer
ri =
{
R0i , if ci = 0
R1i , if ci = 1
ri−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Stop Timer
If collision is detected, If ri ̸= R
ci
i or collision is detected,
A enters into the protection mode. B enters into the protection mode.
Check correctness of ri’s and Check correctness of ri’s and
∆ti ≤ tmax for Case I ∆ti ≤ tmax for Case II
◦ Early-reply strategy with p runs. An attacker who impersonates B wins when Di = 1 or R0i = R1i . Indeed,
when Di = 1, the prover sends a challenge to the verifier (A) and so trivially wins the round. When Di = 0,
the roles are inverted. To win a round, the prover must send his response in advance. When R0i = R
1
i , the
potential answers are the same and the prover definitely wins. Running the cryptographic function p times
allows the prover to find D with a higher Hamming weight than the average one, and R0 and R1 with a lower
Hamming distance. In conclusion, the probability of success is higher with the YKHL Protocol than with
the HK protocol, where the prover wins only when R0i = R
1
i . The probability of success can be calculated
by considering Pr(X = x) =
(n
x
)
( 14 )
x( 34 )
n−x/23n instead of Pr(X = x) =
(n
x
)
/2n in [Avoine et al. 2011].
◦ Circle strategy. Rounds being independent, the circle analysis oﬀers no benefit to an adversary.
13.4. Distance Fraud (Black Box)
◦ Pre-ask combined with early-reply strategy. A distance fraud with the pre-ask strategy is similar to a mafia
fraud in this case. Hence: PrDF|BB|pre&early = PrMF|pre.
◦ Post-ask combined with early-reply strategy. This protocol does not contain any second slow phase and the
first slow phase consists of nonce exchanges only. As per Section 2 we have: PrDF|BB|post&early = PrImp.
◦ Circle strategy. We previously stressed that the circle analysis is worthless for this protocol.
13.5. Terrorist Fraud (White Box)
This protocol is not designed to resist to the terrorist fraud in the white box model. Indeed, the prover can
give the registers to his accomplice to successfully pass the protocol: PrTF|WB = 1.
13.6. Published Attacks
Avoine and Kim demonstrated in [Avoine and Kim 2013] that the security of YKHL protocol is far below
what is claimed in [Yum et al. 2011], and could be even worse than HK protocol in terms of mafia fraud.
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14. SKI PROTOCOLS (2013)
In [Boureanu et al. 2013c; 2013b; 2013a], the authors introduced a series of protocols called SKI. These
protocols are presented in Algorithm 12.
Algorithm 12: The SKI Protocols
Verifier Prover
(secret K) (secret K)
NP←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Pick NP ∈R {0, 1}
δ
Pick a ∈R F
t′n
q
, L ∈ L, and NV ∈R {0, 1}
δ M, L, NV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
M = a+ fK(NP , NV , L) a = M − fK(NP , NV , L), K
′ = L(K)⎡⎣ Pick ci ∈R {1, . . . , t}Start Timer ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ { ri = F (ci, ai, K′i) If ci ∈ {1, . . . , t}Halt Otherwise
Stop timer
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Check the correctness of ris and
∆ti ≤ tmax for at least n− x rounds
i ∈ {1, . . . , t}
OutV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
14.1. Impersonation
The only known way to perform an impersonation consists in guessing all the answers during the fast phase.
Thus, PrImp =
(
1
q
)n
.
14.2. Mafia Fraud
◦ Pre-ask strategy. Using this strategy, the adversary is able to obtain one set of answers from the prover
before executing the fast phase with the verifier. Without loss of generality, we assume that the adversary
obtains {F (1, a1,K ′1), . . . , F (1, an,K ′n)}, i.e., the answers corresponding to the challenges ci’s equal to 1.
Hence, at each rounds two cases occur: (a) the verifier’s challenge is 1 and she knows the answer, this
happens with probability 1/t, or (b) the verifier’s challenge is not 1, thus she has to guess the answer, and
succeeds with probability 1/q. Thus, the rounds independence yields to:
PrMF|pre =
(
1
t
· 1 + (1− 1
t
) · 1
q
)n
=
(
q+ t− 1
qt
)n
. For SKIpro, this is
(
2
3
)n
.
◦ Post-ask strategy. This protocol does not contain any second slow phase and the first slow phase consists
of nonce exchanges only. As per Section 2 we have: PrMF|post = PrImp.
14.3. Distance Fraud (White Box)
◦ Early-reply strategy with one run. Using this strategy, the adversary has to send her answers in advance.
Due to the similarity between Hancke and Kuhn’s protocol and SKI’s protocol, the adversary applies a similar
strategy to maximize her success probability. At each rounds she answers the most probable value among
the possible registers. The most probable answer for a given round is the one that appears the most within
the set {F (1, ai,K ′i), F (2, ai,K ′i), . . . , F (t, ai,K ′i)} of possible answers for this round. In order to compute
the adversary success probability, let define the following events:
—W: the adversary provides the correct answer to the verifier at a given round.
— Bj : j = max
1≤l≤q
{Xl},
where Xl is the number of appearance times of the l-th element from Fq among the set
{F (1, ai,K ′i), F (2, ai,K ′i), . . . , F (t, ai,K ′i)}. We then trivially have: Pr(W) =
∑j=t
j=1 Pr(W|Bj) Pr(Bj), with
Pr(W|Bi) = it . Thus, using the above equation, we deduce: Pr(W) = E
(
max
1≤l≤q
{Xl}
)
· 1t . The tricky task
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consists in computing E( max
1≤l≤q
{Xl}). This is done below for the SKI protocol configurations suggested
in [Boureanu et al. 2013a].
— q = 2, and t = 2: E( max
1≤l≤q
{Xl}) = 32 , and Pr(W) = 34 .
— q = 2, and t = 3: E( max
1≤l≤q
{Xl}) = 94 and Pr(W) = 34 .
— q = 2, and t = 4: E( max
1≤l≤q
{Xl}) = 3 and Pr(W) = 34 .
— q = 4, and t = 3: E( max
1≤l≤q
{Xl}) = 158 and Pr(W) = 58 .
Finally, the independence of the rounds provides PrDF|WB(1)|early = (Pr(W))n. For SKIpro, this is
(
3
4
)n
.
◦ Early-reply strategy with p runs. This strategy does not make sense against these protocols. Indeed, since
the prover does not have the verifier’s nonce before he sends its, he cannot compute several outputs of the
the pseudo-random function.
◦ Circle strategy. Rounds being independent, the circle analysis oﬀers no benefit to an adversary.
14.4. Distance Fraud (Black Box)
◦ Pre-ask combined with early-reply strategy. A distance fraud with the pre-ask strategy is here similar to a
mafia fraud. Hence: PrDF|BB|pre&early = PrMF|pre.
◦ Post-ask combined with early-reply strategy. This protocol does not contain any second slow phase and the
first slow phase consists of nonce exchanges only. As per Section 2 we have: PrDF|BB|post&early = PrImp.
◦ Circle strategy. We previously stressed that the circle analysis is worthless for this protocol.
14.5. Terrorist Fraud (White Box)
◦ Early-provide strategy with one run. Using this strategy, the adversary obtains register(s) before the start
of the fast phase. First, note that the setting in which t′ = t = q = 2 (i.e., SKIlite) does not resist against
terrorist fraud. Second, to compute the success probability in the other cases, let denote k, the number
of registers given by the prover to the adversary. As stated in [Avoine et al. 2011], the insurance that no
information could leak, is furnished by the following equality: k = t− 2.
Once the adversary gets the t − 2 registers, she starts the fast phase with the verifier. Two cases occur,
(a) the verifier asks an answer coming from one of the t− 2 known registers. Thus, the adversary definitely
knows the correct answer. Or (b) the verifier asks her an answer coming from one the two unknown registers,
and she has to guess the correct answer. The adversary consequently succeeds with probability 1
q
. Given the
rounds are independent, we finally have:
PrTF|WB(1) =
(
t− 2
t
· 1 + 2
t
· 1
q
)n
=
(
qt+ 2(1− q)
qt
)n
. For SKIpro, this is
(
2
3
)n
.
◦ Early-provide strategy with p runs. This strategy does not make sense against these protocols. Indeed, since
the prover does not have the verifier’s nonce before he sends its answers, he cannot compute several outputs
of the the pseudo-random function.
15. PROTOCOL COMPARISON
This section provides a summary of the analyses done in Sections 3 to 14. It then provides two approaches
to compare the protocols: the first one consists of charts, while the second one is based on the concept
of clusters. The charts depict the variation of a single parameter regarding another one, e.g., the mafia
fraud success probability as a function of the number of rounds. The second approach introduces clusters of
protocols sharing common security resistances and properties. It is worth remarking that a similar comparison
approach based on decision theory has been recently published in [Avoine et al. 2015]. The findings of that
work do not contradict ours; indeed every protocol found relevant there is also considered relevant here.
15.1. Summary of Properties and Performances
Table VI presents the properties and performances of every protocol analyzed through Sections 3 to 14. The
description of the properties is provided in Section 2. Table VII and VIII summarize which cryptographic
29
building blocks are used and which properties are expected by each considered protocol. Greyed cells in
Table VIII contain results already known, while other cells contain values provided by this survey.
On Table VIII, we can see that only two protocols do not have any attack with probability 1: Swiss-knife
and SKI. In fact, there exists two other protocols which are not in this table: TDB [Avoine et al. 2011] (on
which SKI is based) and the protocol by [Fischlin and Onete 2013b] (which is based on Swiss-knife).
15.2. Chart-based Comparison
Figure 2 depicts the mafia fraud success probability as a function of the number of rounds. The relative
positions between the curves remain unchanged when the number of rounds increases, except for the tree-
based protocol (with l =
√
n), which suﬀers from a step eﬀect due to its structure. Several behaviors are
observed in the figure: BC, for example, has a success probability of (1/2)n, which is the optimal case,
while HK, by contrast, has a (3/4)n success probability. The extreme case would be probability equals to
1 but no protocol falls into this category. Other intermediate behaviors are also present: protocols whose
associated probability is not (1/2)n but tends to (1/2)n when n is large enough (e.g., AT(
√
n)), protocols
whose associated probability is between (1/2)n and (3/4)n, and finally those whose associated probability is
between (3/4)n and 1. These categories are summarized in Table IX.
Figure 3 represents the distance fraud success probability as a function of the number of rounds. As
previously, several behaviors can be distinguished; reported in Table IX. The worst protocols in terms of
distance fraud share a common mechanism where the prover helps the verifier to detect the mafia fraud.
As a consequence, the prover knows (at least partially) the expected challenges, which unfortunately helps
him in mounting a successful distance fraud. The best protocols in terms of distance fraud have a final
slow phase. The best ones without final slow phase have dependent rounds (see Section B.4), namely the
tree-based protocol (with l = 1 and with l =
√
n). Note that the tree-based protocol and Poulidor do not
have close formula to express the associated distance fraud success probability: only a maximum bound is
known, which makes the comparison with other protocols quite unfair.
Table VI: Properties and performances
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BC No No Yes Yes 2ℓ+ n 2n 2n
MAD No Yes Yes No 2(ℓ+ δ + σ) 2n 2n
HK No No No Yes 2δ 2n 2n
MP No Yes Yes Yes 2δ + 3n 2(n− nvoid) 3n
Swiss-knife No Option Yes Yes 2(δ + σ) + n (+σ if mutual) 2n 3n+ 2δ
Tree-based No No No No iﬀ d ≥ 2 2δ + c 2n ℓ(2d+1 − 2)
RC No No Yes No rounds σ 2δV δV + δP
Poulidor No (*) No No No 2δ 2n 4n
KA2 Yes Yes No Yes 2δ 2n 2n
YKHL No Yes No Yes 2δ 2n 3n
SKIpro No No No Yes 2δ + 2n 3n 2n
(*) See Section 11 for a refined analysis about the adaptiveness.
Figure 4 presents the memory needed to store intermediate values during the execution of the protocol,
including the registers. The memory consumption is expressed as a function of the number of rounds. The
curves can be classified into three categories: linear curves, aﬃne curves which are not linear due to a fixed
overhead, and non-aﬃne curves. In the latter case, which includes the tree-based protocol (with l = 1 and
with l =
√
n), the memory consumption is prohibitive. The overhead appears in the protocols that end with
a final slow phase (Swiss-knife, MAD, and RC). In such a phase, the value of the challenges, or commitments
used in the first slow phase, are usually stored all along the protocol execution because they are required for
the final cryptographic operations. A final slow phase is consequently a handicap for implementations.
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Table VII: Cryptographic building blocks
Protocol PRNG Sym. Primitive Commitment Signature
BC Yes Yes Yes
MAD Yes Yes
HK Yes Yes
MP Yes Yes
Swiss-knife Yes Yes
Tree-based Yes Yes
RC Yes Yes Yes
Poulidor Yes Yes
KA2 Yes Yes
YKHL Yes Yes
SKI Yes Yes
Table VIII: Adversary success probabilities
Protocol Imp Mafia Distance Terrorist
pre-ask post-ask early-reply pre & early post & early early-provide
BB BB WB(1) WB(p) BB BB WB(1)WB(p)
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Table IX: Parameters and their values
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3
4
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(
3
4
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< d < 1
Value 6 ma = 1 t = 1 d = 1
Figure 5 represents the mafia fraud success probability as a function of the distance fraud success prob-
ability, with the number of rounds n equal to 36. The figure clearly shows that the protocols are more
resistant to mafia fraud than to distance fraud. Several reasons could probably explain this phenomenon. In
particular, the original objective of distance bounding was – early in the nineties – to protect authentication
protocols against relay attacks. The distance fraud was then a side eﬀect of distance bounding. It has been
only recently, when the need to protect geolocalisation applications against distance frauds arose, especially
when the prover is a mobile device, that distance fraud has started to be considered seriously.
15.3. Cluster-based Comparison
Comparing distance bounding protocols is quite a tricky task given the large number of parameters that can
be considered. A given protocol P1 can be better in terms of resistance against mafia fraud than another
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protocol P2, but at the same time worse in terms of resistance against distance fraud. Thus, ranking P1 and
P2 is very complicated. This section introduces a hierarchical clustering of the distance bounding protocols.
The key-point of the method relies on the observation that a protocol P1 is undeniably better than a protocol
P2 if and only if P1 is better then P2 for every considered parameter. In such a case, P1 should be used,
instead of P2, whatever the considered scenario.
Seven parameters are considered for the cluster-based comparison: mafia fraud resistance (Ma), terrorist
fraud resistance (T ), distance fraud resistance (D), the presence of a final slow phase (L), single bit exchanges
during the fast phase (B), the number of bits exchanged by the two parties during the whole protocol3 (E), and
the memory dependency on the prover side regarding the number of rounds (Me). Note the implementation
complexity is not considered as it would be diﬃcult to find a technology suitable to implement fairly all the
protocols (some protocols depend on the technology).
It is worth mentioning that each parameter can be assigned with a value belonging to an (obviously)
ordered set. The method, for example, sorts the resistance to the mafia fraud Ma according to six values
and, to illustrate the concept, it is clearly better for a protocol to have a mafia fraud success probability
equal to ( 12 )
n than ( 34 )
n. Also, it is better not to need a final slow phase in the protocol, and to use binary
messages than ternary messages, etc. For each parameter, the values can be ordered: (Value 6) ≺ (Value 5) ≺
(Value 4) ≺ (Value 3) ≺ (Value 2) ≺ (Value 1), where (Value i) ≺ (Value j) means that (Value j) is better
3Note that in Table IX, no value is given to the constant. Since we are interested in how the number of exchanged bits scales
the number of rounds, the actual value of the constant does not really matter.
32
than (Value i) or, said diﬀerently, (Value j) is more convenient than (Value i) when implementing a distance
bounding protocol. The parameters and their values are provided in Table IX.
The configuration of a protocol is an element of the cartesian product Ma×T ×D×L×B× E ×Me. All
the possible configurations can be deduced from Table IX, and the configuration of each protocol presented
in this work is provided in Table X. Note that there is no total order relation inMa×T ×D×L×B×E×Me,
but a configuration (ma, d, t, l, b, e,me) is better than a configuration (ma′, d′, t′, l′, b′, e′,me′) if it is better for
every considered parameter: ma′ ≺ ma, d′ ≺ d, ..., me′ ≺ me. As a consequence, there exist several best
configurations in Ma× T ×D × L× B × E ×Me.
A cluster is a set (possibly empty) of protocols which have the same configuration (ma, d, t, l, b, e,me) or
a configuration that is better than this one. A cluster is said better than another one if its configuration
is better. The total number of clusters is large; it is actually equal to the cardinalility of Ma × T × D ×
L × B × E ×Me, which is 63 · 22 · 32 = 7776. However, 5774 clusters are empty, meaning that no protocol
matches the configuration of these clusters. The remaining 2002 non-empty clusters still represent a large
amount of information, which is diﬃcult to condense in a paper. To further reduce this information, only
best configurations are kept, those whose clusters are not empty.
This process can be easily automated. A hierarchy of clusters is built and the best cluster of every branch
is kept. After performing this operation, only 5 clusters remain: {Poulidor}, {Swiss-Knife}, {SKIshamir},
{RC}, and {BC, MAD}. Four of the remaining clusters are actually singletons, which means that among
all the published protocols, none of them are equivalent with respect to the seven considered parameters.
In the remaining cluster, {BC, MAD}, BC and MAD are equivalent since the mutual authentication is not
considered in the configurations. We can also raise that, given constraints on memory, probabilities, etc. the
best known protocol to be used belongs to these 6 finalists.
It is finally interesting to compare these 6 finalists with the distance-bounding evolution provided in
Figure 1. A protocol that is not a finalist should not necessarily be blamed: most of them have been useful
at some point and led to more evolved protocols. However, protocols published today should be new finalists
in the cluster-based comparison, possibly after considering additional parameters in the comparison.
Table X: Protocol configurations
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16. CONCLUSION
Distance bounding authentication protocols represent a new class of protocols aiming to thwart distance-
based attacks whose feasability is rendered possible by emerging technologies. This survey provides a thorough
state-of-the-art of existing protocols and introduces refined security analyses. The comparisons made provide
designers with new means to evaluate their performance in a unified manner according to several security
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and resource paramaters. It may be worthwhile pointing out that the provided cluster-based comparison
can easily be modified to better reflect specific practical considerations and/or to include other protocols.
Finally, we are aware that attacks other than those considered in this paper might exist. Addressing provable
security of distance bounding protocols is therefore a challenge for future research.
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Similarly, V computes the bits r1 = α1 and ri = αi ⊕ βi−1 for i > 1, with which V computes
µV = MACK(IDV ||IDP ||s1||r1|| . . . ||sn||rn). Finally, P and V open the commitment sent in the first slow
phase by transmitting r′ and s′, and exchange the values µP and µV .
◦ Final Decision. The users P and V accept each other’s entity only if:
— the n responses of the fast phase are correct,
— the commitment that was sent in the first slow phase is correctly opened in the second slow phase and
corresponds to the bit sequence (r or s) exchanged during the fast phase,
— the output of the MAC function is correct, and
— the time constraint ∆ti ≤ tmax is met for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and some threshold tmax > 0.
Table XI: Parameters and functions (Algorithm 2)
n Number of iterations in the fast phase, which is also the size of the random numbers r and s
δ Size of the random numbers r′ and s′
κ Size of the secret key K
tmax Threshold of the round-trip time
MACK MAC function keyed with K
σ Output size of the MAC function
h Collision-resistant one-way hash function used to compute the commitment
A.3. Hancke and Kuhn’s Protocol (2005)
In 2005 Hancke and Kuhn published the first distance-bounding protocol [Hancke and Kuhn 2005] (Algo-
rithm 3) clearly dedicated to RFID. The protocol relies on the original ideas of Desmedt et al. [Desmedt
et al. 1988; Bengio et al. 1991] but is diﬀerent from Brands and Chaum’s work [Brands and Chaum 1993] in
the sense that Hancke and Kuhn’s protocol does not have any final signature after the fast phase.
◦ Initialization. Prior to the protocol execution, the legitimate prover and the verifier agree on the security
parameters and functions described in Table XII, and a common secret key K.
◦ Protocol. During the slow phase, the verifier sends to the prover a nonce NV and the prover sends to the
verifier a nonce NP . Both the prover and the verifier then use the pseudo-random function h and the secret
key K in order to generate two n-bit sequences R0 and R1. For each of the n rounds of the fast phase,
the verifier generates and sends a random challenge bit ci, and the prover replies instantly with a one-bit
response that is either R0i or R
1
i , selected by the value of ci.
◦ Final Decision. The verifier accepts the prover’s identity only if the n responses of the fast phase are
correct while meeting the time constraint ∆ti ≤ tmax, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, for some threshold tmax > 0.
Table XII: Parameters and functions (Algorithm 3)
n Number of iterations in the fast phase
κ Size of the secret key K
δ Size of nonces NV and NP
tmax Threshold of the round-trip time
h Hash function whose output size is 2n
A.4. Bussard and Bagga’s Protocol (2005)
Bussard and Bagga published the DBPK-Log protocol (Algorithm 4), which is a distance-bounding protocol
based on a proof of knowledge and a commitment scheme [Bussard and Bagga 2005].
◦ Initialization. Prior to protocol execution, the prover and the verifier agree on the security parameters and
functions described in Table XIII. A trusted authority then chooses and publishes the following values: p, a
large safe prime such that p = 2q + 1 with q a large prime; g, a generator of Z⋆p; and h, a random value in
Z⋆p. Once done, the prover selects a secret x ∈ Zp−1 \ {q} and the trusted authority then needs to create and
publish a certificate for his public key y = gx.
◦ Protocol. The prover P possesses a private key x which is an odd secret, randomly chosen in Zp−1 \ {q},
whose corresponding public key is y = gx mod p. The prover picks a random one-time key R0 ∈ {0, 1}n,
and encrypts his private key x with R0, using the encryption scheme E, i.e., he gets R1 = ER0(x) =
x − R0 mod (p − 1). The prover then commits to each bit of R0 and R1 independently using the Commit
function (see Remark A.1). Then, for each of the n rounds of the fast phase, the verifier generates and sends
a random challenge bit ci, and the prover replies instantly with a 1-bit response that is either R0i or R
1
i ,
selected by the value ci. A second slow phase then starts, where the prover allows the verifier to open the
commitment of each bit Rcii , for each challenge ci that has been sent in the previous phase.
◦ Final Decision. The verifier checks the timing and verifies that the received values correspond to the
committed ones (Open function is described in the original paper). A verification protocol is finally executed
between P and V using a proof of knowledge. Note that [Bussard and Bagga 2005] only states that “at the
end of distance-bounding stage, the verifier V is able to compute an upper bound on the distance to P .”
Table XIII: Parameters and functions (Algorithm 4)
n Number of iterations in the fast phase, n = m+m′
m Security parameter m = ⌈log2 p⌉
m′ Security parameter
E Encryption scheme (additive cipher): E(x) = x− k mod (p− 1)
Commit Commit function of the commitment scheme
Open Open function of the commitment scheme
PK[(x, v) : z = Ω(x, v) ∧ y = Γ(x)] Proof of knowledge for x and v
Remark A.1 (Commitment). The suggested Commit function works as follows: (a) a value h is randomly
chosen in Z⋆p, (b) the values vR0,i and vR1,i, ∀i ∈ {0, ..., N − 1}, are randomly chosen in Zp−1, (c) Ci(R0) =
gR
0
i hvR0,i mod p and Ci(R1) = gR
1
i hvR1,i mod p.
A.5. Munilla and Peinado’s Protocol (2006)
Munilla and Peinado introduced in [Munilla et al. 2006; Munilla and Peinado 2009] the concept of void
challenges as a tool to improve distance-bounding protocols. These void challenges can also be used to
decrease the mafia fraud success probability when applied to Hancke and Kuhn’s protocol [Munilla and
Peinado 2008a], which is the case analysed in this section. Thus, for this protocol (Algorithm 5), the challenges
can be 0, 1 or void, where a void challenge means that no challenge is sent. Void challenges are used to detect
a mafia fraud using the pre-ask strategy.
◦ Initialization. Prior to the protocol execution, the prover and the verifier agree on the security parameters
and the functions described in Table XIV, and a common secret key K.
◦ Protocol. During a first slow phase, the verifier sends to the prover a nonce NV and the prover sends to
the verifier a nonce NP (Remark A.2). They both then use the pseudo-random function h and the secret key
K to generate three n-bit sequences: R0, R1 and Z. The values R0 and R1 are, as in Hancke and Kuhn’s
protocol, the responses to the challenges, while Z defines which challenges are void. In the fast phase, the
verifier sends random challenges ci when Zi = 1, and the prover instantly replies with 1-bit responses ri that
are either R0i or R
1
i , depending on the value of ci: ri = R
ci
i . If the prover receives a challenge for an interval
where Zi = 0, he assumes that the system is being attacked and aborts the protocol. Finally, the prover
sends h(K,R0, R1) in a final slow phase to confirm that no adversary has been detected.
◦ Final Decision. The verifier accepts the prover as genuine only if the final signature is correct and all the
responses ri are correct and timely: ∆ti ≤ tmax, i ∈ 1, 2, · · · , n, for some threshold tmax > 0.
Remark A.2. The paper does not specify whether the verifier or the prover sends its nonce in first.
Table XIV: Parameters and functions (Algorithm 5)
n Number of iterations in the fast phase (it coincides with the length of vectors R0, R1 and Z)
κ Size of the secret key K (not defined in the original paper)
δ Size of random numbers NV and NP (not defined in the original paper)
tmax Threshold of the round-trip time
pf Probability of an interval being non-void (optimal value pf = 4/5, and practical value pf = 3/4)
h Hash (or pseudo-random) function whose output size is 3n
Remark A.3. During the fast phase, 2(n − nvoid) bits are exchanged, where nvoid is the number of void
challenges for the protocol run. Given the average number of void challenges, namely n(1− pf ), the average
number of exchanged bits is 2npf .
A.6. Kim, Avoine, Koeune, Standaert and Pereira’s Protocol (2008)
Kim, Avoine, Koeune, Standaert and Pereira introduced a protocol in [Kim et al. 2008] known as the Swiss-
knife distance-bounding protocol4 (Algorithm 6).
◦ Initialization. Prior to the protocol execution, the legitimate prover and the verifier agree on the security
parameters and functions described in Table XV, a system-wide constant C known to the verifier and the
prover, and a common secret key K.
◦ Protocol. During the first slow phase, the verifier chooses a nonce NV ∈R {0, 1}δ and a random binary
vector D with Hamming weight n and length σ. Intuitively, D corresponds to a mask pointing to the positions
on which the prover will be questioned during the fast phase. He transmits NV and D to the prover. The
prover chooses a nonce NP ∈R {0, 1}δ and computes a := fK(C,NP ). The prover then computes two registers
using its permanent key K as follows: Z0 := a and Z1 := a ⊕K. He finally prepares the possible answers
by extracting the relevant parts of Z0, Z1 according to the mask D, building the n-bit vectors R0 and R1.
The prover ends the slow phase transmitting NP to the verifier. During the fast phase, the verifier generates
and sends a random challenge bit ci, and the prover replies instantly with a 1-bit response that is either v0i
or v1i , selected by the value of ci. After n iterations, the prover computes TB := fK(c
′
1, . . . , c
′
n, ID,NV , NP )
and transmits TB and the challenges c′1, . . . , c
′
n received during the fast phase. The verifier performs a search
over its database until he finds a pair (ID,K) and computes R0, R1. If mutual authentication is expected,
the verifier computes TA := fK(NP ), sends it to the prover who checks its correctness.
◦ Final Decision. The authentication succeeds if and only if errC + errR + errT < T .
Table XV: Parameters and functions (Algorithm 6)
n Number of iterations in the fast phase
σ Size of the output of f and consequently size of the secret key K
δ Size of nonces NV and NP
tmax Threshold of the round-trip time
T Threshold of tolerable errors
f Pseudo-random function whose output size is σ
A.7. Avoine and Tchamkerten’s Protocol (2009)
The protocol (Algorithm 7) introduced by Avoine and Tchamkerten in [Avoine and Tchamkerten 2009] is a
generalization of Hancke and Kuhn’s protocol that is more secure in terms of mafia and distance frauds.
◦ Initialization. Prior to the protocol execution, the legitimate prover and the verifier agree on the security
parameters and functions described in Table XVI, in addition to a common secret key K.
4Like Swiss-army knives used during WWII, the Swiss-knife protocol is a multi-purpose tool. The authors claim their protocol
“resists against both mafia fraud and terrorist attacks, reaches the best known false acceptance rate, preserves privacy, resists
to channel errors, uses symmetric-key cryptography only, requires no more than 2 cryptographic operations to be performed by
the tag, can take advantage of precomputation on the tag, and oﬀers an optional mutual authentication” [Kim et al. 2008].
◦ Protocol. It consists of a slow authentication phase followed by a fast proximity check phase. Both phases
have their own security parameters: the credential size c for the authentication and the number of bit
exchanges n between the prover and the verifier during the fast phase.
◦ Authentication. The verifier sends a nonce NV to the prover, in the form of a uniformly random bit-string
of size δ. The prover then generates a δ-bit nonce NP and, based on NV and NP , computes a keyed-hash
value hK(NV , NP ) whose output is a string of at least c + ℓ · (2d+1 − 2) bits where d, ℓ ≥ 1 are such that
d·ℓ = n. The prover sends to the verifier both NP and the first c bits of hK(NV , NP ) denoted [hK(NV , NP )]c1.
◦ Proximity Check. Using the subsequent q = ℓ · (2d+1 − 2) bits of the hash value hK(NV , NP ), denoted by
[hK(NV , NP )]
c+q
c+1, the prover and the verifier label ℓ full binary trees of depth d as follows (see Figure 6 for
an example). The left and the right edges of each tree are labeled 0 and 1 respectively, and each node of
each tree, except the root, is associated with the value of a particular bit in [hK(NV , NP )]
c+q
c+1 in a one-to-one
fashion.5 This labeling is possible since each tree has 2d+1−2 nodes (excluding the root), which gives a total
of ℓ · (2d+1 − 2) nodes to be labeled.
An n-round fast bit exchange between the verifier and the prover proceeds using the trees: the edge
and the node values represent the verifier’s challenges and the prover’s replies, respectively. At each step
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} the verifier generates a challenge in the form of a randomly uniform bit ci and sends it to
the prover. Now let j ≥ 1 be such that (j − 1)(2d+1 − 2) + 1 ≤ i ≤ j(2d+1 − 2). Upon receiving ci, the
prover replies ri, which corresponds to the value of the node in the j-th tree whose edge path from the root
is given by c(j−1)(2d+1−2)+1, c(j−1)(2d+1−2)+2, . . . , ci. The example illustrated by Figure 6 uses the following
parameters: n = 6, ℓ = 2, and d = 3. The sequence of challenges is (1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0), which corresponds to the
two thick edge paths in the trees starting with the tree on the left. The corresponding sequence of replies is
(1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0). Note that each reply ri is a function of at most d previous cj ’s. Finally, for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
the verifier measures the time interval ∆ti between the instant ci is sent until the instant ri is received.
◦ Final Decision. The verifier accepts the prover’s identity only if the c authentication bits are correct and
if the n replies of the fast phase are correct while meeting the time constraint ∆ti ≤ tmax, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
for some threshold tmax > 0.
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Fig. 6: Two decision trees of depth 3, i.e., ℓ = 2, d = 3
Remark A.4. The case n = d · ℓ is the maximum situation where all d replies of the ℓ-th tree are used.
We impose this constraint only to have somewhat simpler performance expressions. It is easy to see that this
constraint can be replaced by d · ℓ ≥ n, which is the situation where the last tree is only partly used.
Remark A.5. When d = 1 and ℓ = n, the fast phase of the protocol is similar to the one of HK Protocol.
A.8. Rasmussen and Cˇapkun’s Protocol (2010)
The protocol (Algorithm 8) was introduced by Rasmussen and Cˇapkun and originally appeared in [Rasmussen
and Cˇapkun 2010]. In this paper we consider the updated version that appeared in [Rasmussen 2011].
◦ Initialization. Prior to the protocol execution, the legitimate prover and the verifier agree on the security
parameters, the functions described in Table XVII, and a common secret key K.
5To do this, one sequentially assigns the bit values of [hK(NV , NP )]
c+q
c+1 to all the nodes of each tree, starting with the lowest
level nodes, moving left to right, and moving up after assigning the nodes of the current level.
Table XVI: Parameters and functions (Algorithm 7)
n Number of iterations in the fast phase
κ Size of secret key
δ Size of nonces NV and NP
c Credential size
d Depth of each tree
ℓ Number of trees (d and ℓ satisfy d · ℓ = n)
tmax Threshold of the round-trip time
hK Keyed-hash function whose output size is a bit string of size at least c+ ℓ · (2d+1 − 2)
◦ Protocol. The prover starts the protocol by picking a fresh (large) nonce NP . The prover then commits
(using for example a hash) on NP and its identity. This commitment is not keyed. The prover now activates
its distance-bounding hardware and set the output channel according to the opposite of the first bit of the
nonce NP . From this moment on, any signal that the prover receives on channel C0 will be reflected on the
output channel that is set. However, the prover does not start switching between output channels yet.
Upon receiving the commitment, the verifier picks a fresh (large) nonce NV and prepares to initiate the
distance-bounding phase, in which it will measure the distance bound to the prover. The verifier starts a
high precision clock to measure the (round trip) time-of-flight of the signal, ∆t, and begins to transmit his
nonce NV on channel C0. From this point on, the verifier also listens on the two reply channels C1 and C2
and keeps listening on the two channels until he either receives the expected response from the prover or
until he detects an error and aborts the protocol.
As soon as the prover receives (and, in parallel demodulates) the first bit of NV on C0, he starts switching
reply channels according to the bits of his nonce NP . When the first few bits are being demodulated, the
prover is still reflecting the input (challenge) bits and the switching of the channels is not started yet (i.e.,
the prover does not start sending back NP yet). This function, used by the prover to form its reply to the
verifier, is called “Challenge Reflection with Channel Selection” (CRCS). The demodulation of the bits is
not done within the distance-bounding hardware (called the distance-bounding extension), but is done in the
prover’s regular radio. A possible implementation of the distance-bounding extension (i.e., of CRCS) using
analog mixers is described in [Rasmussen 2011]. It is not important how long it takes for the prover’s radio
to demodulate the first bits since the prover does not need to begin to switch the output channels within any
predefined time as long as the prover keeps track of the delay n. The delay represents the time taken by the
prover to react to the incoming signal, i.e., to switch its circuit to transmit the first bit of its answer. The
switching starts within the duration of NV , and allows the transmission of NP . The first part of NV could
even be known and constitute a public and fixed-length preamble, upon the detection of which the prover
would start switching the channels (i.e., would start sending NP ).
When the prover starts sending NP , he sends the bits of NP with a fixed frequency (e.g., every 100ms)
by switching channels depending on the value of the current bit. In each interval, the prover reflects back
several bits of NV and a single bit of NP . The bit of NP is encoded in the choice of the reply channel. The
prover also receives in parallel the verifier’s challenge nonce (i.e., NV ) on channel C0 using his regular radio.
When the verifier has sent all the bits of his nonce, he waits for the prover to complete the reflection of the
signal and then both the prover and verifier disable their distance-bounding extensions. The verifier can then
use an auto-correlation detector like the ones used in GPS receivers to determine the exact time of flight, ∆t,
of the reflected signal. This can also be done during the distance-bounding phase, i.e., in parallel to the analog
distance-bounding circuit. Finally, the prover sends a signed message compounded by the commitment sent
during the first slow phase, the delay n, his nonce NP , and the verifier’s identity and nonce.
◦ Final Decision. The verifier accepts the prover’s identity only if the bits of NP were sent within the same
time duration, these bits match with those he received in the final message of the prover, the reflection of
NV through the channel switch was correct, the signature in the final message is correct, the delay n′ he
computed match with the prover’s one n (including in the final message), and finally that the round-trip
time is below the time threshold tmax.
A.9. Trujillo-Rasua, Martin and Avoine’s Protocol (2010)
Poulidor, the graph-based distance-bounding protocol (Algorithm 9) designed by Trujillo-Rasua, Martin,
and Avoine [Trujillo-Rasua et al. 2010], uses specific node and edge dependencies in the tree of the AT
Table XVII: Parameters and functions (Algorithm 8)
δV Size of the verifier’s challenge nonce NV
δP Size of the prover’s nonce NP
σ Lower bound for the size of the commitment and the signature
tmax Threshold of the round trip time
Commit Secure commitment function that outputs σ bits.
Sign Signature function whose output size is σ
protocol [Avoine and Tchamkerten 2009] – which then can alternatively be represented by an acyclic graph.
Poulidor benefits from a lower memory requirement compared to the AT protocol. Security is also reduced.
◦ Initialization. Prior the protocol execution, the legitimate prover and the verifier agree on the security
parameters and functions described in Table XVIII, and a common secret K.
Table XVIII: Parameters and functions (Algorithm 9)
n Number of iterations in the fast phase
κ Size of the secret key K
δP and δV Size of nonces NP and NV respectively
tmax Threshold of the round-trip time
H Hash function whose output size is 2n
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Fig. 7: Graph when n = 4
◦ Protocol. During the slow-phase, both the verifier and the prover build a directed graph G. The proposed
graph requires 2n nodes {q0, q1, . . . , q2n−1}, and 4n edges {s0, s1, · · · , s2n−1, ℓ0, ℓ1, · · · , ℓ2n−1} such that, si
(0 ≤ i ≤ 2n−1) is an edge from qi to q(i+1) mod 2n, and ℓi (0 ≤ i ≤ 2n−1) is an edge from qi to q(i+2) mod 2n.
Figure 7 depicts the graph when n = 4.
In order to build G, the verifier sends a nonce NV to the prover, and the latter sends a nonce NP to the
verifier. From these values, and the secret K, they compute H = h(K,NP , NV ) and set up a graph G as
follows: the first 2n bits are used to value the nodes while the remaining bits are used to value the edges
si (0 ≤ i ≤ 2n − 1), and finally ℓi = si ⊕ 1 (0 ≤ i ≤ 2n − 1). After agreeing on the graph, the fast phase
begins. This phase consists of n stateful rounds numbered from 0 to n − 1. Initially qp0 = qv0 = q0, but in
the i-th round P ’s state and V ’s state are represented by the nodes qpi and qvi respectively. Upon reception
of the i-th challenge ci, P moves from the node qpi to qpi+1 in the following way: qpi+1 = q(pi+1) mod 2n if si
is labeled with ci, otherwise qpi+1 = q(pi+2) mod 2n. Finally, the prover sends as response ri the bit-value of
the node qpi+1 . Upon reception of the prover’s answer ri, the verifier stops his timer, and computes ∆ti, i.e.,
the round trip time spent for this exchange. Besides this, V moves to the node qvi+1 using the challenge ci
(as the prover did but from the node qvi) and checks if qvi+1 = ri.
◦ Final Decision. The verifier accepts the prover’s identity only if n responses of the fast phase are correct
and the time constraint ∆ti ≤ tmax, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, for some threshold tmax > 0.
A.10. Kim and Avoine’s Protocol (KA2) (2011)
Kim and Avoine introduced in 2009 a distance-bounding protocol with mixed challenges [Kim and Avoine
2009], namely challenges known and challenges unknown in advance by the prover. Challenges known in
advance allow the prover to help the verifier to detect an attack, but these challenges also allow the prover
to perform a distance fraud. Kim and Avoine improved their protocol in 2011, yielding a new variant known
as KA2 [Kim and Avoine 2011], which is analyzed in this section (Algorithm 10).
◦ Initialization. Prior to the protocol execution, the legitimate prover and the verifier agree on the security
parameters and functions described in Table XIX, along with a common secret key K.
◦ Protocol. The verifier sends the prover a nonce NV and the prover sends the verifier a nonce NP . They
then use the pseudo-random function h and the secret key K to generate a 2n-bit sequence D||R0||R1.
During the first α rounds, the verifier sends predefined 1-bit challenges ci. In every round, the prover sends
a 1-bit response that is R0i if ci = Di. Otherwise, he sends random answers until the end of the fast phase.
During the remaining n − α rounds, the verifier sends random 1-bit challenges ci. In every round, the
prover sends a 1-bit response that is Rcii , or he sends random answers until the end of the fast phase if a
problem (ci ̸= Di) was detected during the first α rounds.
◦ Final Decision. The verifier accepts the prover’s identity only if n responses of the fast phase are correct,
while also meeting the time constraint ∆ti ≤ tmax, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, for a threshold tmax > 0.
Table XIX: Parameters and functions (Algorithm 10)
n Number of iterations in the fast phase
κ Size of the secret key K
δ Size of nonces NV and NP
tmax Threshold of the round-trip time
α Number of predefined rounds
h Pseudo-random function whose output size is 2n
A.11. Yum, Kim, Hong and Lee’s Protocol (2010)
Yum, Kim, Hon and Lee created a distance-bounding protocol with mutual authentication [Yum et al. 2011].
◦ Initialization. Prior to the protocol execution the users A and B agree on the security parameters and
functions described in Table XX, in addition to a common secret key K.
◦ Protocol. The protocol consists of a slow phase where two nonces (NA and NB) are exchanged, and a fast
phase where challenge bits ci and response bits ri are exchanged. In the slow phase, the users compute three
n-bit sequences, D,R0, and R1 using a pseudo-random function applied to NA and NB . In the i-th round
of the fast phase, each user acts as a prover or a verifier according to the “direction bit” Di. When Di = 0,
A sends a random challenge bit ci and B answers with Ri
ci , i.e., the i-th bit of the register Rci . When
Di = 1, B sends a challenge and A responds. If the received response bit is incorrect, the recipient moves to
a “protection mode”: he sends random bits for all subsequent rounds. Each user also checks that no collision
occurred in the round, that is, the two users did not talk or remain silent simultaneously.
◦ Final Decision. A accepts B as legitimate only if the responses of the fast phase are correct and meet the
time constraint ∆ti ≤ tmax for Case I, for some threshold tmax > 0. So does B for Case II.
Table XX: Parameters and functions (Algorithm 11)
n Number of iterations in the fast phase
κ Size of the secret key K
δ Size of nonces NA and NB
tmax Threshold of the round-trip time
h Pseudo-random function whose output size is 3n
A.12. SKI Protocols (2013)
In [Boureanu et al. 2013c; 2013b; 2013a], the authors introduced a series of protocols called SKI. These
protocols (presented in Algorithm 12) are described as follows.
◦ Initialization. Prior to the protocol execution, the legitimate prover and the verifier agree on the security
parameters and functions described in Table XXI, and a common secret K.
Table XXI: Parameters and functions (Algorithm 12)
n Number of iterations in the fast phase
t Size of the challenges domain
t′ Security parameter
q Power of a prime number
κ Size of the secret key K
δ Size of the nonces NP and NV
tmax Threshold of the round-trip time
f Pseudo random function whose output size is t′n elements of Fq
x Maximum number of incorrect rounds
◦ Protocol. During the slow phase, the prover first generates a nonce NP , and sends it to the verifier. The
verifier then generates its nonce NV along with a = (a1, . . . , at′) (ai ∈ Fnq where Fq is the finite fields of order
q and the authors of [Boureanu et al. 2013a] employ in concrete examples q = 2) and a mapping L ∈ L,
where L is defined below. Using its nonce and the prover’s nonce, he computes fK(NP , NV , L) and XORs it
with a, in order to obtain the mask M . Finally, the verifier sends NV , L, and M to the prover. Using these
two values and its nonce, the prover computes a and K ′ = L(K).
Then the n-round fast phase begins. In each round, the verifier picks a challenge ci ∈ {1, . . . , t} at random.
Then, he starts a timer and sends ci to the prover. Upon reception of the challenge, the prover first checks
whether ci belongs to {1, . . . , t}. If ci /∈ {1, . . . , t} the protocol stops. If ci ∈ {1, . . . , t}, the prover computes
its answer, ri = F (ci, ai,K ′i), where the function F is presented in more details below. The prover then sends
its answer back to the verifier. Once the verifier received ri, he stops its timer and stores ∆ti, the round trip
time of the round i, as well as ri.
As discussed below, the SKI protocol is specified with another set L = Lbit containing all functions Lµ,
for µ ∈ Fκq defined by Lµ(K) = (µ ·K, . . . , µ ·K) i.e., Lµ(K) is the n-bit vector in which all bits are set to
the dot product of µ and K.
◦ Final Decision. The protocol succeeds if there are at least n − x rounds i for which ri is correct and
∆ti ≤ tmax. The verifier then outputs a message OutV , denoting the success or failure of the protocol.
Remark A.6. With respect to the mapping in L introduced along with SKI, note that usual distance-
bounding protocols would employ L = Lclassic i.e., the set containing a single function L which is the identity
function. Thus, in those case, L(K) = K (imposing further that κ = n). The value of x also introduced
along with SKI is used to tolerate some level of noise in the time-critical exchanges. However, introducing
this tolerance brings a new type of terrorist fraud, as it will be discussed in Section B.5. The purpose of
L = Lbit is precisely to defeat this attack. But, to compare with other protocols, our analyses below assume
x = 0 and L = Lclassic.
Remark A.7. The function F is essential for the SKI protocols. Using a diﬀerent function leads to diﬀerent
protocol security achievements. Specifically, the authors mainly refer to the eﬃcient cases of q = 2, t′ = 2,
and F (1, ai,K ′i) = (ai)1, F (2, ai,K
′
i) = (ai)2, and F (3, ai,K
′
i) = K
′
i + (ai)1 + (ai)2, where K
′
i ∈ GF (2),
(ai)j ∈ GF (2), j = 1, 2. Generally speaking, this response function, denoted Fxor, can be given as follows:
Fxor(ci, ai,K ′i) = K
′
i1ci=t+(ai)11ci∈{t,1}+ . . .+(ai)t−11ci∈{t,t−1}, where ci ∈ {1, . . . , t}, K ′i ∈ GF (q), q ≥ 2,
(ai)j ∈ GF (q), j ∈ {1, . . . , t− 1}, and 1R is 1 if R is true and 0 otherwise.
The authors actually consider two variants SKIpro with t = 3 and SKIlite with t = 2, namely SKIlite never
uses the ci = 3 challenge. Other cases (treated separately) are summarized as follows:
— SKI4: defined by the response-function Fxor above, with q = 2, t = 4, t′ = 3, i.e., F (ci, ai, xi) = (ai)ci for
ci ∈ {1, 2, 3} and F (4, ai,K ′i) = K ′i + (ai)1 + (ai)2 + (ai)3, with (ai)1, (ai)2, (ai)3,K ′i ∈ GF (2);
— SKIshamir: defined by a variant of response-function based on the Shamir secret sharing, with q = 4, t = 3,
t′ = 2, i.e., F (ci, ai,K ′i) = K
′
i + (ai)1c¯i + (ai)2c¯
2
i for c¯i ∈ GF (4)∗, with (ai)1, (ai)2 ∈ GF (4). Here, c 0→ c¯
denotes a one-to-one mapping from {1, 2, 3} to GF (4)∗.
While SKIpro can be presented as a variant of the TDB protocol proposed in [Avoine et al. 2011] and SKIlite is
very similar to the Hancke and Kuhn protocol [Hancke and Kuhn 2005], other variants of F can be suggested,
yielding diﬀerent SKI protocols. These functions have to respect the requirements provided in [Boureanu
et al. 2013a]. These are informally summarized in Remark A.8.
Remark A.8 (Requirements for the function F and the set L; (see [Boureanu et al. 2013a] for details)).
The F function must comply to the following conditions, in order to ensure security, as stated in Section 1.6.
(1) For any ci, F (ci, ·, ·) must be GF (q)-linear and non-degenerate in the ai part.
(2) For any two values ci and c′i of the i-th challenge and for any ai, F (ci, ai,K
′
i) and F (c
′
i, ai,K
′
i) give no
information about K ′i.
(3) For any ai, one can compute K ′i from the table of the map ci 0→ F (ci, ai,K ′i).
(4) For any K ′i, the largest preimage of ci 0→ F (ci, ai,K ′i) must be small, on average over ai.
The third requirement above is used for resistance to terrorist fraud. Note that SKIlite does not satisfy it, so it
does not resist to terrorist fraud. The requirement on L is that given a source generating some (L,L(K)+ e)
for L ∈ L uniformly distributed and e of “small” Hamming weight, and arbitrary distribution, then K can
be reconstructed.
B. VARIANTS AND EXTENSIONS
Appendix B presents generic improvements that can be applied on distance-bounding protocols.
B.1. MUltiState Enhancement: MUSE
Although location-based authentication services that measure the round trip time of entire data packets
have been proposed [Waters and Felten 2003], most of the distance-bounding protocols are based on the
measurement of the round trip time of 1-bit messages. Munilla and Peinado [Munilla et al. 2006; Munilla
and Peinado 2008a] initiated a new family of protocols that use an additional third state during the fast
phase. Although binary data are still exchanged during that phase, Munilla and Peinado suggest to use void
challenges. These void challenges, which means that no challenge is sent, are used to authenticate the verifier,
reducing thus the success probability of a pre-ask strategy.
MUSE is a generalization of this idea proposed by Avoine, Floerkemeier, and Martin [Avoine et al. 2009],
where the number of possible states used during the fast phase can be still larger: the authors indeed extend
the concept of void challenges to p-symbols where p ≥ 2. Using p-symbols is a generic technique that reduces
the number of rounds during the fast phase. Algorithm 13 describes MUSE-3 HK, which is the 3-symbol
variant of HK. In MUSE-3 HK, H = h(K,NV , NP ) is used to fill up three registers Rj (j = 0, 1, 2) that each
contains n 3-symbols {Sjn+1, ..., Sjn+n}. When considering the mafia fraud against MUSE-3 HK, the success
probability is PrMF|pre =
(
5
9
)n
, which is better than the 3-symbol protocol of Munilla and Peinado [Munilla
et al. 2006; Munilla and Peinado 2008a]. Note that to be able to easily generate and store p-symbols (p > 2)
on prover side the authors suggested to encode challenges and responses on ⌈log2(p)⌉ bits.
Algorithm 13: Hancke and Kuhn’s Protocol with MUSE-3
Verifier Prover
(secret K) (secret K)
Pick NV ∈R {0, 1}
δ Pick NP ∈R {0, 1}
δ
NV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
NP←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
H = h(K,NV , NP )
R0 = S1 ||S2 || . . . ||Sn
R1 = Sn+1||Sn+2|| . . . ||S2n
R2 = S2n+1||S2n+2|| . . . ||S3n
H = h(K,NV , NP )
R0 = S1 ||S2 || . . . ||Sn
R1 = Sn+1||Sn+2|| . . . ||S2n
R2 = S2n+1||S2n+2|| . . . ||S3n[
Pick ci ∈R {0, 1, 2} and Start Timer
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Stop Timer
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ri = R
ci
i
Check correctness of ri’s and
∆ti ≤ tmax for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
B.2. PUF-based protocols
Kardas¸, Kiraz, Bingo¨l, and Demirci introduce in [Kardas¸ et al. 2011] two novel distance-bounding protocols
based on Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs). A PUF is defined as an unclonable function embedded in
a physical structure that is easy to implement but practically impossible to duplicate, even given the exact
manufacturing process definitions. The output of the function is obtained as a result of inherent physical
properties such as delays of gates and wires in a circuit, variations in the temperature and supply voltage.
The unclonability of the function is guaranteed by these physical processes, and some mechanisms (e.g.,
Fuzzy Extractors) are used to ensure the determinism. Since PUFs behave as a random function (if one
assumes that all the physical properties cannot be predicted), without having the actual PUF circuit it is
hard to predict the outputs as given the inputs. Moreover, their intrinsic structure yields resistance against
tampering since physically tampering will most likely change its physical structure.
The authors define a strong adversary model in which the adversary has access to volatile memory of the
prover, namely an RFID tag. PUF functions are used to prevent an adversary from obtaining the long-term
secrets and clone the tags. The main idea is that long-term secrets are not stored in the memory of the
prover but they are reconstructed from pre-secrets using a PUF circuit during each protocol execution.
The first protocol proposed by Kardas¸ et al. is described in Algorithm 14. They use two diﬀerent long-term
keys K and L which are consecutively generated as outputs of the PUF function. Note that K and L never
appear in the volatile memory at the same time. First, K is constructed by using PUF, and then completely
deleted from the memory after being used as a key of PRF function. Then similarly, L is generated and
deleted after generation of registers. Hence, whenever an adversary tampers the tag she can only obtain one
of the keys, under the assumption that the structure of the PUF circuit has been destroyed after the attack
thus PUF cannot be re-evaluated anymore. The authors state that since the adversary cannot retrieve all
the long-term keys, she can only perform the attack in black-box model.
Given that the success probability of mafia and terrorist frauds remains high, namely (3/4)n, the authors
introduce an extended protocol with a final signature that reaches (1/2)n against these frauds.
Algorithm 14: Kardas¸ et al.’s protocol based on PUF without final signature
Verifier Prover
(secret K,L) (pre-secret G1, G2)
Pick NV ∈R {0, 1}
δ Pick NP ∈R {0, 1}
δ
NV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
K = PUF (G1)
T = fK(NP , NV )
Delete K
L = PUF (G2)
v,R0, R1 = fL(T )
|v| = |R0| = |R1| = n
Delete L
NP , v←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
v′, R0
′
, R1
′
= fL(fK(NP , NV ))
If v′ ̸= v then abort[
Pick ci ∈ {0, 1} and Start Timer
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
ri = R
ci
i
Stop Timer
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Check correctness of ri’s and
∆ti ≤ tmax for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
B.3. Threshold Distance-Bounding Protocol to Defeat Terrorist Fraud
Many distance-bounding protocols are subject to terrorist fraud as the long-term key cannot be retrieved
in practice from the information needed to successfully pass the protocol. Avoine, Lauradoux, and Martin
in [Avoine et al. 2011] suggest that a secret-sharing scheme, possibly based on threshold cryptography can
be used to thwart terrorist fraud. In their proposal, the authentication material consists of p shares of a
(p, k) threshold scheme: if the prover reveals any combination of k shares to the adversary, the long-term
secret leaks. By contrast, gathering strictly less than k shares reveals no information about the secret.
To illustrate this, the authors describe a variant of HK, which they call TDB (Threshold Distance-
Bounding), where the responses to the challenges are generated using a threshold scheme. This protocol
diﬀers from HK in the way the registers are generated during the slow phase: after the nonce exchange,
verifier and prover use their shared secret K to compute a p× n matrix R over a group G. The matrix R is
used to respond to the challenges as follows. The verifier requires the prover during the i-th round the value
rci,i in R (ci-th row and i-th column). The challenges consequently consist of ⌈log2 p⌉ bits and the responses
of ⌈log2 |G|⌉ bits. The calculation of R is such that the knowledge of any combination of k elements of a
given column reveals a coordinate of the key.
R =
⎛⎜⎝ r1,1 . . . r1,n... . . . ...
rp,1 . . . rp,n
⎞⎟⎠
The authors introduce in [Avoine et al. 2011] three classes of adversaries: i.) BD-ADV or blind-adversary,
who does not learn whether the protocol succeeds, ii.) RE-ADV or result-adversary, who can observe if the
protocol succeeds and, iii.) RD-ADV or round-adversary, who has the capability of observing the result of each
round. They then analyze the resistance of their approach when facing each of these adversaries, according
to the parameters p and k. The parameter p is actually critical regarding mafia fraud, while k impacts the
probability of a successful terrorist fraud.
For BD-ADV, the maximum number of elements of a column of R which can be safely given to the adversary
is k− 1. As a result, and for this adversary, TDB implemented with (p, 2) threshold scheme is secure against
terrorist fraud (this probability coincides with that for the mafia fraud) for any p ≥ 2.
When the other adversaries are considered, the post-ask strategy must be analyzed. These adversaries can
learn two elements of each column of R for each protocol round, modifying all the challenges ci received
from the verifier and sending the modified versions ĉi to the prover; i.e., ∀i ĉi ̸= ci. If a round succeeds, then
r̂ci = rci . The RD-ADV can do this on all rounds in parallel, while RE-ADV is limited to a single round per
attack. So, TDB should be used with k ≥ 3 if we want to protect the key against those stronger adversaries.
On the other hand, the prover should give to the adversary at most k−2 shares at each round (and not k−1
as when BD-ADV was analyzed). Thus, in the context of RE-ADV and RD-ADV, to be secure against terrorist
fraud attack, schemes (p, 3) for any p ≥ 3 should be used.
The authors also describe a variant, called TTDB, that reduces the number of systems of shares computed.
Whereas a column of R is used only once in TDB, the same column is used q times in TTDB. TTDB actually
diﬀers from TDB on three points: i.) The size of prover’s answers; TTDB works on vectors of q coordinates
in G, and therefore the responses of the prover are elements in Gq. ii.) The matrix computation; each distinct
column is repeated q times in the matrix. The overall number of rounds is kept constant n, and consequently
there are only n/q distinct columns in R. The resulting p× n matrix R over Gq is defined by:⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
q times q times︷ ︸︸ ︷
r1,1...r1,1 . . .
︷ ︸︸ ︷
r1,n/q...r1,n/q
...
. . .
...
rp,1...rp,1 . . . rp,n/q...rp,n/q
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
Finally: iii.) when working on a given distinct column of R, the challenges ci are not allowed to be repeated.
The results show that TTDB is a generalization of TDB for the terrorist fraud. For BD-ADV, TTDB is
secure when q = k − 1. Stronger adversaries, with the post-ask strategy, can recover at most 2q shares for
round. Therefore (p, 2q + 1) threshold schemes should be used, and the prover, when colluding with the
adversary, should only reveal q shares. For these values, TTDB is also secure against terrorist fraud.
B.4. Previous-Challenge Dependent Protocols
Previous-challenge dependent distance-bounding protocols are analyzed by Kara, Kardas¸, Bingo¨l, and Avoine
in [Kara et al. 2010]. They focus on the low-cost distance-bounding protocols having bitwise fast phases and
no final signature. As for the classification, they introduce the notion of k-previous challenge dependent
(k-PCD) protocols where each response bit depends on the current and the k previous challenges. First, the
authors analyze the case k = 0, that is when each response bit depends on the current challenge only, and
the case k = 1. They show that the latter provides a better security than the former one and propose a
natural extension to transform 0-PCD protocols into 1-PCD protocols. This modification consists in a simple
polynomial arithmetic operation to compute the responses.
The authors show that mafia fraud and distance fraud are correlated by providing trade-oﬀ curves between
the security levels of these two attacks. They give the theoretical security bounds for two classes: 0-PCD
and 1-PCD. The authors thus claim that protocols can be designed to enforce the mafia or distance fraud
resistance, but not both at the same time, without increasing the memory needs. For k = 0 they find that
PrMF(R) + PrDF(R) ≥ 3/2, where PrMF(R) and PrDF(R) are the maximum probabilities for an adversary
of correctly guessing one bit response for mafia fraud and distance fraud respectively. As a consequence of
this result, one can conclude that protocols with k = 0 cannot attain the ideal security against distance
fraud, i.e., PrDF(R) = 1/2, without being totally vulnerable against mafia fraud; and also that the security
of mafia fraud cannot be better than 3/4.
The optimal security limit for mafia fraud and the trade-oﬀ curve for protocols with k = 1 turn out to be
PrMF(R) ≥ 5/8 and PrMF(R) + PrDF(R) ≥ 5/4 respectively, and therefore it lies below that the previous
one for k = 0. Thus, the ideal security level against distance fraud can be reached with PrMF(R) ≥ 3/4.
Finally, the authors apply the natural extension to HK for improving distance fraud resistance in one case,
and for improving mafia fraud resistance in the other case6.
The authors leave as an open question to construct trade-oﬀ curves for k ≥ 2, but they conjecture that
the security should be enhanced when k is increased.
B.5. Distance bounding over noisy channels
Distance-bounding protocols are conducted over noisy wireless ad hoc channels. The fast phase consists, for
the most part, of single bits sent between the prover and the verifier. Due to the unreliability of the channel,
the communicating parties might receive erroneous bits during this phase. Being robust to relatively high
bit-error rates is a desirable property for a distance-bounding protocol.
There are two main approaches in the literature to make distance-bounding protocols noise-resilient, both
requiring to increase the number of rounds during the fast phase.
The first and easiest approach to deal with noise is to allow up to x incorrect responses during the
fast phase: the distance-bounding protocol succeeds if at least (n − x) bit-responses sent by the prover are
correct. This technique can be easily applied when the correctness of each of the n responses can be verified
independently, which is the case for most distance-bounding protocols.
The second approach consists of using an error correcting code. It can be applied on many protocols but it
is particularly useful in protocols where one single bit error does not allow the verifier to check the correctness
of the other rounds (e.g., in BC protocol). The idea is to apply an (n, k) error correcting code on a bitstring
of length k, which is used by the prover to compute the responses in the fast phase (e.g., to compute a XOR
of the i-th bit of this bitstring and the challenge). The error correcting code is constructed in such a way
that it can correct at least x bit errors. By applying this code to the bitstring, its length increases to n bits.
These n bits are then used in the fast bit exchange phase. After this phase, the verifier applies the error
correcting code to compute and verify the original bitstring of k bits. Note that only the parameter k has
an influence on the security, in contrast to n.
Note that most distance-bounding protocols can be easily made noise-resilient by applying one of the two
approaches. The second approach can be used by BC and MAD protocols, while the first approach can be
easily applied on most other distance-bounding protocols. However, it seems harder to make DBPK-Log,
Tree-based, Poulidor, and RC protocols noise-resilient.
When implementing a noise-resilient distance-bounding protocol, it is of the utmost importance to ac-
curately estimate the bit error rate expected during the fast phase. If the estimation on the number x of
expected bit errors is lower than the actual bit error rate then the false rejection ratio is significant, meaning
that some honest provers are not accepted by the verifier. However, a high x aﬀects the security level of
the protocol in a negative way: an attacker can guess some responses wrongly, and blame it on the noise.
Consequently, when analyzing the security properties of a noise-resilient distance-bounding protocol, it is
typically assumed that no noise is present during the fast phase, but the verifier allows up to x bit errors.
This is the worst case scenario. The success probability of an attacker depends on x. This often makes the
analysis more complex and the comparison of various distance-bounding protocols diﬃcult. Noise resilience
has consequently not been considered in the analyses of the protocols provided in Sections 3 to 14.
6Note that there is a typo in [Kara et al. 2010], where it should be yici ⊕ y
i−1
ci−1
instead of yici ⊕ y
i
ci−1
.
